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Abstract
The main thesis of this Article is that after 1994, with the nomination of new qadis to the
Shari‘ah Court, a process of judicial activism began, which continues until this day. This process
has been characterized by the qadis’ attempts to strengthen the position of the Shari‘ah Appeals
Court. In some fields the qadis’ activism has been more successful than in others. Recently
however, it seems that the Shari‘ah system is undergoing a crisis. The author will analyze the
actions of the Shari‘ah Appeals Court on several parallel levels: (1) the strengthening of its position
compared with those of the civil courts and the regional Shari‘ah Courts; and (2) a symbolic
strengthening of its position in relation to (i) Israeli Law; (ii) the litigants and their attorneys; and
(iii) the Muslim public. The author will then analyze the current crisis of the Shari‘ah system and
the need for reform. The author will focus upon the internal dynamics of the Shari‘ah Court of
Appeals, the interaction of its different actors, and suggest reforms to be made that will strengthen
the legitimacy of its position in relation to the State of Israel and with the Muslim populous. Before
proceeding to the analysis, however, some background regarding the religious Muslim world in
Israel is necessary.

JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OF THE SHARI'AH
APPEALS COURT IN ISRAEL (1994-2001):
RISE AND CRISIS
Dr. Moussa Abou Ramadan*
INTRODUCTION
The individuals belonging to the Palestinian minority in
Israel have what is known as a "multiple identity."' Part of their
identity involves a religious dimension, and ignoring this means
ignoring an important aspect of Israeli Arab legal status, especially considering the dissimilar treatment that different religious minorities receive in Israel. 2 Muslims in Israel are discriminated against in terms of their degree of autonomy, expressed,
inter alia, by limits imposed on their degree of control over their
religious establishments. The discrimination is also expressed in
the lack of appointed qadis3 with a formal Shari'ah education in
the Islamic religious courts,4 which serve eighty percent of the
* Haifa University, Assistant Professor, Law Faculty. Dr. Abou Ramadan was an
Emile Noel Fellow at the Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic
Law and Justice at the New York University Law School, New York City. He would like
to thank Ya'akov Meron, Amnon Reichman, Ido Shachar, Jennifer Ridha, and Ilan
Saban for their comments on the previous drafts of this article, and also his research
assistants: Mohammad Wattad and Eyal Magen. Dr. Abou Ramadan thanks Michael
Prawer for his editing. Additionally, Dr. Abou Ramadan would like to thank the editors
and staff of the FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL, especially Regis Shannahan and
his staff for their efforts and time in editing this Article. Dr. Abou Ramadan followed a
modified version of the transliteration system, as established by the INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES. The Article does not contain any diacritical marks
except for ayn and hamza. All translations from foreign languages are done by the
author, unless otherwise mentioned. All foreign sources, including laws, court rulings,
and dissertations, are on file with the author, unless otherwise noted. The author bears
sole responsibility for the contents of the Article. The analysis does not address developments after the year 2001 concerning the rulings of the Shari'ah Court of Appeals.
1. See, e.g., Elie Rekhess, Resurgent Islam in Israel, 27 ASIAN & AFR. STUD. 189-206
(1993) (discussing an individual in the Islamic movement in Israel who perceives himself as having a "multiple identity" due to being Muslim, Arab, and Palestinian).
2. See generally Moussa Abou Ramadan, Les Minorites en Israel et le Droit International (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Aix Marseille Ill) (on file with author).
See also infra note 7 and Conclusion of this Article.
3. In the context of this Article, the term "qadi" is used to mean a judge in a
Shari'ah Court.
4. See infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.

RISE AND CRISIS

Israeli Arabs, representing one million Muslim citizens in Israel.5
The religious dimension is legally relevant to Israeli Arabs in
at least two areas. The first area of relevance relates to the organization of the community,6 the second, to family matters. Regarding family matters, there are different religious communities in Israel whose religious courts have jurisdiction under Israeli law to deal with matters of personal status that include
marriage, divorce, child custody, and child support. Jews and
Muslims do not compose legally recognized religious communities in Israel,7 but their religious courts nonetheless have jurisdiction in those matters. These courts apply the personal law
that the Supreme Court of Israel has defined as being the religious law of the community in question.' For an understanding
of the legal status of Muslims in Israel, I will critically examine
their principal religious court that deals with matters of personal
status: the Shari'ah Court of Appeals in Israel. Such an examination discloses the attitude of the State of Israel toward Mus5. State of Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel No. 54
(2003), available at http://194.90.153.197/reader/shnatonenew.htm.
6. See infra Section IX.
7. A recognized religious minority has a specific legal identity in Israel. Article 2 of
the Palestine Order in Council ("P.O.I.C."), as modified in 1939, states: "Religious
community means any community mentioned in the Second Schedule of this order and
any community which may be declared by the high Commissioner by order to be a
religious community." Therefore, the P.O.I.C. definition of a religious community is
substantial, and its criterion formal: a religious community is every community that is
mentioned in the Second Schedule of the P.O.I.C., or is recognized by the high Commissioner. The Schedule of the P.O.I.C., as amended in 1939, lists eleven communities:
the Eastern (Orthodox) Community, the Latin (Catholic) Community, the Gregorian
Armenian Community, the Armenian (Catholic) Community, the Syrian (Catholic)
Community, the Chaldean (Uniate) Community, the Jewish Community, the Greek
Catholic Melkite Community, the Maronite Community, the Syrian Orthodox Community. See Palestine (Amendment) Order in Council, May 25, 1939 (Government of Palestine: Ordinances, Regulations, Rules, Orders and Notices, Annual Volume for 1939,
Vol. II, 459, 465). The Israeli government recognized the Anglican Episcopal Church
in 1970. 1970, K.T. 1564. The Israeli government recognized the Bahai'i Community in
1971. 1971, K.T. 628. The Druzes were recognized for the first time in 1957. 1957,
K.T.1280. This was based on the 1926 Religious Communities Organization Ordinance.
See 2 ROrERT HARRY DRAYTON, THE LAWS OF PALESTINE 1292 (1933). The Jews in Israel
today do not constitute a religious community as defined by the Ordinance. The Muslims were never recognized as a religious community. For a comprehensive overview on
this topic, see H.C. 6168/92, Secular-Humanist Association in Israel v. The Government of
Israel, 51 P.D. 289.
8. C.A. 26/51, Kotik v. Wolfson, 5 P.D. 1341, 1345 (Zilberberg,J.). For more details on the family law in Israel, see generally MENASHE SHAVA, THE PERSONAL LAW IN
ISRAEL (2001) (In Hebrew).
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lims.' Examining the Shari'ah Court of Appeals is also important for gaining a perspective of human rights issues concerning
women and children as the Court attempts to reconcile the doctrines of Islamic law with the emerging concerns of feminist organizations. Thus, the first aspect of this examination concerns
the State of Israel's treatment of Muslims, and the second, the
treatment of Muslims by Muslim officials (qadis). Significantly,
this second aspect has never been seriously challenged.1"
The main thesis of this Article is that after 1994, with the
nomination of new qadis to the Shari'ah Court, a process ofjudicial activism began, which continues until this day. This process
has been characterized by the qadis' attempts to strengthen the
position of the Shari'ah Appeals Court. In some fields the qadis'
activism has been more successful than in others. Recently however, it seems that the Shari'ah system is undergoing a crisis.
I will analyze the actions of the Shari'ah Appeals Court on
several parallel levels: (1) the strengthening of its position compared with those of the civil courts and the regional Shari'ah
Courts; and (2) a symbolic strengthening of its position in relation to (i) Israeli Law; (ii) the litigants and their attorneys; and
(iii) the Muslim public. I will then analyze the current crisis of
the Shari'ah system and the need for reform. I will focus upon
the internal dynamics of the Shari'ah Court of Appeals, the interaction of its different actors, and suggest reforms to be made
that will strengthen the legitimacy of its position in relation to
the State of Israel and with the Muslim populous. Before proceeding to the analysis, however, some background regarding
the religious Muslim world in Israel is necessary.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE RELIGIOUS MUSLIM WORLD
IN ISRAEL
During the Ottoman period, Muslims comprised the majority of the population in present-day Israel and as such required
no special representative body. To Christian communities and
Jews during this period, the millet system" conferred religious
9. See infra Section I.
10. See generally Moussa Abou Ramadan, The Transitionfrom Tradition to Reform: The
Shari'a[h]Appeals Court Rulings on Child Custody (1992-2001), 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 595
(2003).
11. For the millet system, see ANTON ODEH ISSA, LES MINORITES CHRETIENNES DE
PALESTINE A TRAVERs LES SIECLES:

ETUDE HISTORICO-JURIDIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT
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autonomy, but was not relevant for Muslims. During the British
Mandate in Palestine, Muslims continued to comprise the majority of society, marking this period as the first time since the Crusades that a Muslim majority had lived under a non-Muslim regime. The British formally severed Muslims from their administrative religious center.' 2 In 1921, the British issued an Order
establishing the Supreme Muslim Council, which was perceived
13
as an act of "appeasement towards the Palestinian Muslims."
The Head of the Council was a lifetime appointee and other
members were elected. The Council had competence in religious matters and was endowed with control over religious appointments, and the waqf 14 system. It also had the power to control and nominate Shari'ah qadi. 15 In implementing a system of
substantive law, the British, by ordinance, adopted Ottoman
Family Law and adapted it exclusively for the Muslim population. 6 In 1937, the British amended the Order of 1921 and
MODERNE INTERNATIONAL 188-93 (1976); GEORGES BATEH, STATUT PERSONNEL: INTRODUCTION A L'ETUDE DE LA CONDITION RIDIQUE

DES CHRETIENS DE PALESTINE SOUS LA

(1517-1917) 107-30 (1963); Benjamin Braude, Foundation
Myths of the Millet System, in 1 CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: THE FUNCTIONING OF A PLURAL SOCIETY 69-88 (Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis eds., 1982)
[hereinafter 1 CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE]; Kemal H. Karpat, Millets
and Nationality: the Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era, in I
CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, supra, at 141-84.
12. See Proclamations Ordinances and Notices Issued by Occupied Enemy Territory Administration ("O.E.T.A.") (South), art. 9, at 10 (Aug. 1919). "The right of recourse from Moslem religious Courts to the Sheikh ul-Islam in Constantinople shall be
abolished and there shall be substituted therefore an appeal to a Court to be established." Id. For notification for the establishment of this court, see id. at 14.
13. URI M. KUPFERSCHMIDT, THE SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL: ISLAM UNDER THE
BRITISH MANDATE FOR PALESTINE 17 (EJ. Brill 1987).
14. "Waf, or religious endowment, means withdrawal from circulation of the bare
ownership (raqaba) of a property owned by the founder, and transmission of its proceeds to goals determined by the founder. The waqf management is also chosen by the
founder." Aharon Layish, The Muslim Waqf in Jerusalem After 1967: Beneficiaries and Management, in LE W4AQF DANS LE MONDE MUSULMAN CONTEMPORAIN (XIX-XX SIECLES):
FONCTIONS SOCIALES, ECONOMIQUES ET POLITIQUES 145 (Faruk Bilici ed., 1994). See also
DOMINATION

OTTOMANE

RICHARD VAN LEEUWEN, WAQFS AND URBAN STRUCTURES:

THE CASE OF OTTOMAN DAMAS-

cUs 11-12 (E.J. Brill 1999) (noting that the waqf becomes the property of God). According to al-Kasani, ajurist belonging to the Hanafi school, "the waqf is simply the suppression of a property right in the waqf and the transferring of it completely to God." ALKASANI, BADAI' AL-SANAI'I FI TARTIB AL-SHARA'I'I' 219 (1974). See infra Section II.C (discussing waqfs and the Shari'ah Appeals Court jurisdiction).
15. A Shari'ah qadi is a judge in a Muslim religious court.
16. An Ordinance to Providefor the Application of the Ottoman Family Law, 25 October
1333 (1333 A.H.), in I Legislation of Palestine 1918-1925, at 48 (Norman Bentwich ed.,
1926) [hereinafter LEGISLATION OF PALESTINE]. On this law, see ROBERT H. EISENMAN,
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members of the Council were now appointed, as opposed to
elected. 17
With the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the autonomous Muslim religious world collapsed. The Muslim ulamas,t8
muftis, 9 qadis, and members of the Supreme Muslim Council
fled the country.2z Only one mufti serving in the city of Taybe
remained. 21 The State appointed four qadis who had already obtained Azharis education.2 2 The Israeli State failed to resolve the
problem of establishing formal religious Muslim education, although there were several limited attempts. From 1967 onwards,
Muslims from Israel had the opportunity to study in the Occupied Territories, 2 ' even with State assistance. Muslim imams
from the Occupied Territories were also permitted to come and
preach in Israel. This exchange was significant for two reasons.
First, it enabled Arabs in Israel to discover and explore their
identity. Second, it provided Israeli Muslims with the opportunity of contact with the Muslim religious world in the Occupied
Territories, most of which had been restructured since 1948.
However, the first Intifada, or uprising, beginning in 1987, seA HISTORY OF THE SURVIVAL OF TANZIMAT AND
SHARI'A[H] IN THE BRITISH MANDATE AND THE JEWISH STATE 34-45 (1978); JE. Tucker,
ISLAMIC LAW IN PALESTINE AND ISRAEL:

Revisiting Reform: Women and the Ottoman Law of Family Rights, 1917, ARAB STUD. J., 4-17
(1996).
17. Palestine (Defence) Order in Council, 1937 (Supp. No.2 to the Palestine Gazette Extraordinary § 73) (Oct. 16, 1937).
18. An ulama is a specialist in Islamic law. On the ulama, see generally MUHAMMAD
MUHAMMAD QASIM,

THE ULAMA

IN CONTEMPORARY

ISLAM:

CUSTODIANS

OF

CHANGE

(2002).
19. A mufti is a person who gives legal opinion according to Islamic law. On muflis
and fatwa, see generally KHALID M. MASUD, ISLAMIC LEGAL INTERPRETATION:

MUFTIS AND

THEIR FATWAS (Brink Messick & David Powers eds., 1996). See also infra notes 147-48
and accompanying text (addressing the Shari'ah Court's position on fatwas).
20. AHARON LAYISH, WOMEN AND ISLAMIC LAW IN A NON-MUSLIM STATE: A STUDY
BASED ON DECISIONS OF THE SHARI'A[H] COURTS IN ISRAEL 1 (1975).

21. ORI STENDEL, THE ARABS IN ISRAEL BETWEEN HAMMER AND ANVIL 84 (1992) (In
Hebrew).
22. A1-Azhar is a Muslim institution famous for its teaching of Islamic law. It is
situated in Cairo, Egypt, and before 1948 Palestinians could study there. After the establishment of the State of Israel, Muslims from Israel were prevented from studying
there because of the state of war. Now, even though peace exists between Israel and
Egypt, AI-Azhar still does not allow Muslims from Israel to study there. On this institution, see BAYARD DODGE, AL-AZHAR: A MILLENNIUM OF MUSLIM LEARNING (1961); MALIKA
ZEGHAL,

GARDIENS

DE

L'ISLAM:

LES

OULEMAS

D'AL

AZHAR

DANS

L'EGYPTE

CON-

TEMPORAINE (1996); Tamir Moustafa, Conflict and Cooperation Between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt, 32 INT'L. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 3, 3-22 (2000).
23. These are the areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
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verely impeded the continuity and intensiveness of the religious
and cultural exchange between Israel's Muslims and those of the
Occupied Territories. The rising Islamic movement that took
root amongst the Israeli Arabs and those living in the Occupied
Territories during the 1980s expressed increasing dissatisfaction
with the Muslim Establishment and called for new leadership.2 4
In 1996, this movement split into two separate factions. The
first, considered by Israel to be the more moderate faction,
sought political representation in the Knesset by participating in
elections. 25 The second, considered by Israel to be radical, refused to seek election in the Knesset, but participated in local
elections.2 6
Another source of potential leadership in the religious spectrum of Muslims in Israel is the Mufti of Palestine, who tries to
control and lead the Muslim community in Israel. The Mufti of
Palestine, who is currently nominated by the President of the
Palestinian National Authority, has on several occasions declared
his intention to serve the Muslims of Israel. The Mufti has occasionally compared himself to the Greek Orthodox or Latin Patriarch, whose spiritual jurisdiction is without borders. His actions
can be described better as those of cooperation with the Muslim
Establishment, than as subversive attempts to challenge the Israeli State. The Mufti encourages Palestinian imams to come to
Israel and encourage Israeli Arabs to study Shari'ah in the institutions of the Occupied Territories. In 1978, the Mufti also
played an important role in obtaining permission for Israeli Mus2 7
lims to make the religiously mandated pilgrimage to Mecca.
24. For the purpose of this Article, the Muslim Establishment in Israel is made up
of the Shari'ah Courts, and the Board of Trust Committees that are empowered to
administer the religious endowments. The Islamic movement became dissatisfied with
the qadis because of their lack of education in Shari'ah, and also due to the cooperation
of some qadis in delivering fatwas that legitimized the dispossession of Muslims from
their waqfproperties. See ALSA RUBIN PELED, DEBATING ISLAM IN THEJEWISH STATE: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY TOWARD ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN ISRAEL 12, 122, 141-42 (2001).
25. This faction of the Islamic movement has one member in the Knesset [Israeli
Parliament] after the last elections occurred in January 2003.
26. LAURENCE LOUER, LES CITOVENS ARABES D'IsRAEL 189-90 (2003).

The discus-

sion of whether the Islamic movement should present itself to election was raised in
1992, but at that time there was no split. See Rekhess, supra note 1. On the municipal
level, this faction of the Islamist movement won the election in the important city of
Um al-Fahim.
27. For all of the information mentioned in this paragraph, see Laurence Louer,
Les Citoyens Arabes D'Israel: Analyse D'une Communautarisation 453-60 (2001) (un-

260

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 27:254

Israel, however, recognizes neither the Mufti of Palestine
nor the Islamic movement as the representative of Israeli Muslims. Moreover, the schism within the Islamic movement itself
has weakened its ability to take a leadership role. The Mufti of
Palestine, too, has had to cooperate with the religious establishment to conduct his work.
What remains of the Ottoman Muslim religious system in
Israel today are the Shari'ah Courts and the Board of Trust committees. Israel established five boards of trust in 1965 that were
empowered to administer the waqfs [religious endowments] that
had been expropriated by Israel upon its creation in 1948, but
which were ultimately released back to the Muslim communities.2 8 Nevertheless these boards generally failed to assume any
leading role within the Muslim community.2 9
Within the Shari'ah system itself, the Shari'ah Appeals
Court fulfills a particularly important role, because it fills the existing leadership vacuum. The importance of the Shari'ah Appeals Court derives from the fact that non-Muslims cannot legislate regarding Muslim religious matters.3" This kind of problem
published Ph.D. dissertation, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris) (on file with author).
28. M. DUMPER, ISLAM AND ISRAEL: MUSLIM RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS AND THE JEWISH STATE 25-62 (1994).
29. See id.
30. Even a Muslim ruler cannot enact a law because the origin of law is in God
according to classical theory of sources of Islamic law. Wael B. Hallaq has explained:
It is well known that the legal profession in classical and medieval Islam, on all
levels, was generally independent of any [S]tate regulation. Muslim [S]tates
and governments throughout the centuries had no hand in the training and
certification of jurists and jurisconsults whose task it was to formulate the law.
True, the [S] tate exercised some influence on the court system, but it did not
interfere in the processes through which the law was determined. This was
exclusively the province of the jurists andjurisconsults who were largely independent in their practice of the law.
WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIc LEGAL THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SUNNI
USUL AL-FIQH 208 (1997).
However, in modern times, Muslim rulers assumed the ability to legislate different
matters involving Islamic Law, beginning with the codification of certain portions of
Muslim law, such as that of the Mejelle (civil Islamic law) of the Ottoman Sultan (the
head of the Ottoman State). The Sultan adopted the Ottoman Family Law of 1917,
which continues to be enforced in Israel today. This shifted the approach towards Islamic law from one of non-interference in legal processes, to one of adoption of law by
legislation, which varied by topic and by country. However, because Israel is not a Muslim State, problems are raised in terms of the legitimacy and legality of Islamic law
regarding the legislation of matters for the Muslim community.
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does not exist for other recognized minorities in Israel, who
maintain their own representative religious bodies. The absence
of a communitarian organization and the State de-legitimization
of the functions of the Islamic movement and the Mufti of Palestine, increase the importance of the official Shari'ah system in
Israel. The Shari'ah Appeals Court, particularly since 1994, with
the nomination of two activist qadis to the Court, has strengthened its position.
In this context it should not be forgotten that the Shari'ah
Court functions within a State that legally defines itself as a Jewish State, as opposed to a Muslim State. Consequently, its starting point is weak, and thus the Shari'ah Appeals Court has frequently found itself in situations that have forced it to "prove
itself." The issue of its legitimacy and its efficacy does not just
concern its function in a non-Muslim State, which itself poses
difficult problems regarding the status of Muslims"' where there
is no Islamic legislator.3" Rather, the issue concerns the ability of
the Shari'ah Appeals Court to function in a State that positively
defines itself as ajewish State, currently in a state of conflict with
the part of the Nation to which the Court belongs."
The case of the Shari'ah Court in Israel is sui generis in that
it is the only instance in which the Muslims, as a minority group,
are governed by a Jewish majority. Further, the Court must also
deal with the liberal character of the State, in the sense of gender equality, legislation and case law, together with the organizations battling for women's rights.3 4 Structurally speaking, the
Shari'ah Court therefore finds itself in a difficult position. Tremendous importance attaches to its location in the religious, political, and legal fields, and considerable importance attaches to
the personalities of the qadis that served during the period
under examination. I refer particularly to Qadi Ahmad Natur,
who serves as the Head of the Shari'ah Appeals Court, and Qadi
31.

ABou

Dis141-87 (1994); Sami A. Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, La Migration Dans la Conception Musulmane, ORIENTE MODERNO 219,
219-83 (1994).
32. See infra Section VIII.
33. Ilan Saban, The Legal Status of Minorities in Divided Democratic States: The
Arab Minority in Israel and the French Speaking Minority in Canada (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University) (on file with author).
34. Such organizations include the Women's Association Against Violence, and
the Network for Women in Israel.
KHALED

EL-FADL, ISLAMIC LAW AND MUSLIM MINORITIES: THEJURISTIC

COURSE ON MUSLIM MINORITIES, ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY
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Farouk Zoebi. Both have secular legal educations, though
neither have a formal education in Shari'ah studies.3 5 However,
they both utilize their knowledge of the Shari'ah together with
their knowledge of Israeli law, and it is their opinions that have
helped shape the Court during this period. The rulings of the
Appeals Court should be read with consideration for the external pressures to which it is subject, as well as to the internal pressures and competition between the two leading qadis.3 6
The Shari'ah Appeals Court in Israel was established in
1953, under the Qadis (Confirmation of Appointments) Law,
1953." 7 From the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948
until 1953, no appeals were heard until the firstjudgment of the
Shari'ah Appeals Court was given on October 25, 1954.3 The
last eight years attest to intensive judicial activism on the Court's
part, in an attempt to achieve an overall reform in Islamic law.
Together with the substantive aspect of reforming Islamic law in
matters of divorce, custody, waqfs, alimony, and maintenance,
the Court's activism has also strengthened its status. This transformation in status was achieved in part by the Islamization of
certain parts of Israeli civil law4" and of various rules of procedure.4 1 The other key to strengthening the position of the
Shari'ah Appeals Court has been its frequent declaration of rely42
ing exclusively upon the Shari'ah.

35. On the education of the qadis in Israel, see Yitzhak Reiter, Qadis and the Implementation of Islamic Law in Present Day Israel, in IsLAmic LAw: THEORY AND PRACTICE 20509 (R. Cleave & E. Kermeli eds., 1997).
36. I should further add that in the period under examination there was a third
qadi - Zachi Madlaj. However, since his decisions related primarily to factual issues, I
will not discuss them.
37. SHARI'AH COURT LAW (CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS) (1953).
38. According to the sijil (the booklet on which the judgments of the Shari'ah
Court of Appeals were written) there is no official publication for the rulings of the

Shari'ah Appeals Court. I consulted the sijil. Since 1994, the judgments have been
transcribed and saved on computers.
39. See Reiter, supra note 35, at 208. See generally Abou Ramadan, supra note 10.
40. See, e.g., Abou Ramadan, supra note 10, at 615-23 (describing the Shari'ah
Court of Appeal's adoption of the principle of the child's best interests).
41. See infra Section V.

42. Id.
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II. THE ATTEMPT TO BROADEN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
SHARIAH COURTS IN RELATION TO THE
CIVIL COURTS
The struggle between judicial forums is not unique to the
Shari'ah Court in its interaction with the civil courts. The same
struggle exists between the Rabbinical Courts and the civil
courts,4 3 as well as between the civil courts themselves, especially
between the National Labor Court and the High Court of Justice.4 4
The jurisdiction of the Shari'ah Courts, until the enactment
of the amended Family Court Law of November 14, 2001,45 was
broader than the jurisdiction of other State religious courts at
that time. The Shari'ah Courts derived their authority from Section 52 of the Palestine Order in Council ("P.O.I.C."), 4" and
matters of personal status enumerated in Section 51 of the
P.O.I.C. do not apply to Muslims. 47 This determination was first
43. See Ruth Halperin-Kadri, Civil Family Law, Israeli Style: Appeasement, Dignity, Justice, Equality and Intention as the Basis of Family, 17 MECHKAREI MISHPAT 105, 105-57
(2001).
44. See generally Aharon Barak, Judicial Review and Governmental Responsibility: The
Scope ofJudicial Review by the Supreme Court Over Rulings of the National Labour Court, 38
HAPRAKLIT 263 (1989).
45. See Family Court Law, 1995, S.H. 1537, amended by Amendment No. 5 of Nov.
14, 2001, S.H. 1810; see also Abou Ramadan, supra note 10, at 596 ("After this Amendment, disputes concerning custody could be adjudicated in either civil or Islamic
courts.").
46. Section 52 states:
Moslem religious courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction in matters of personal
status of Moslems in accordance with the provisions of the Law of Procedure
of the Moslem Religious Courts of the 25th October, 1333, A.H., as amended
by any Ordinance or Rules. They shall also have, subject to the provisions of
any Ordinance or of the Order of the 20th December, 1921, establishing a
Supreme Council for Moslem Religious Affairs, or of any Orders amending
the same, exclusive jurisdiction in cases of the constitution or internal administration of a Waqf constituted for the benefit of Moslems before a Moslem
Religious Court ....
3 ROBERT HARRY DRAYTON, THlE LAWS OF PALESTINE 2569, 2581 (1934) (quoting the
Palestine Order in Council, 1922 [hereinafter P.O.I.C.]).
47. Section 51 states:
Subject to the provisions of Articles 64 to 67 inclusive jurisdiction in matters of
personal status shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Part
by the Courts of the religious communities established and exercising at the
date of this Order. For the purpose of these provisions, matters of personal
status mean suits regarding marriage or divorce, alimony, maintenance, guardianship, legitimation and adoption of minors, inhibition from dealing with
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given by the Special Tribunal4 8 in the context of paternity in S.C.
1/62, Abu Angele v. Registration Clerk of Residents Register, Tel-Aviv
Jaffa, 17(4) P.D. 2751." 9 The Court reasoned that although "paternity" is not included as one of the matters of personal status
listed under Section 51, the Shari'ah Court nonetheless has exclusive jurisdiction over paternity because its jurisdiction is determined by Section 52 of the P.O.I.C., which refers to the Law of
Procedure of the Moslem Religious Courts of October 25, 1333,
A.H. 50 This law defines which matters the Shari'ah Courts are
authorized to adjudicate. This law also grants the Shari'ah
Court exclusive jurisdiction over maintenance litigation between
Muslim spouses. 5' However, the Court's jurisdiction has been
limited due to later rulings by the Israeli Supreme Court and to
an overall metamorphosis of personal law. The trend in applying personal law increasingly subordinated litigants to a territorial principle, applied uniformly to all, as opposed to applying
the personal law of the litigants determined by their communal52
religious affiliation with a particular community.
An additional limitation on the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah
Court was occasioned by an Israeli Supreme Court ruling that
property of persons who are legally incompetent, successions, wills and legacies, and the administration of the property of absent person.
Id. at § 51.
48. According to section 55 of P.O.IC: "Whenever a question arises as [to]
whether or not a case is one of personal status within the exclusive jurisdiction of a
Religious Court, the matter shall be referred to a Special Tribunal of which the constitution shall be prescribed by Ordinance."
49. See S.C. 1/62, Abd al Kader Abu Angele v. Registration Clerk of Residents Register, Tel-Aviv Jaffa, 17(4) P.D. 2751.
50. Section 7 states:
[T] he Courts are authorized to adjudicate and rule in the following matters:
Duties of endowments Assets and orphans legally created, Guardianship, Wills
and Succession Incompetency and cancellation and the proof of majority, Appointment and dismissal of Guardians, Matters of Absentees, Claims in relation to Marriage and Divorce, Mohar, Child Support, registration of estates,
division between heirs and establishment of entitlement under law.
Law of Procedure of the Moslem Religious Courts of the 25th of October, 1333, A.H.
§ 7 (1917).
51. See C.A. 250/83, Sahar Omri et al. v. Mohamad Abd Alphatah Ibrahim Zoebi et
al., 39(2) P.D. 113. See also Yehoshua Menashe Gruss, Notes for theJurisdiction of the District Court in Matters of Maintenancefor the Islamic and ChristianSpouses, 34 HAPRAKLIT 258
(1982); Menashe Shava, Jurisdiction in Maintenance Matters for the Non Jewish Spouse, 3
IYNIEI MISHPAT 640 (1981); Ya'akov Meron, Jurisdictionand Law in Child-Supportfor Muslims: Proscriptionand the Right to Child Support, 36 HAPRAKLIT 190 (1984).
52. See generally, MENASHE SHAVA, THE PERSONAL LAw IN ISRAEL (2001) (In Hebrew).
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denied the Shari'ah Court jurisdiction over claims concerning
paternity or child support for a child born out of wedlock." Justice Cheshin refused to accept the claim that such jurisdiction
exists, 5 4 writing, "one can only detract from something which exists and not from something which does not exist. '5 5 Justice
Cheshin further added that it is inconceivable that the Israeli
legislature would have interfered by instructing the Shari'ah
Court to rule according to Israeli maintenance law and against
its own religion." Finally, he added, "[t]he [State] courts and
the Religious Court both have their particular jurisdiction, but
57
human dignity is above all these."
This judgment demonstrates that jurisdiction over maintenance claims, to the extent that the religious law does not recognize such a right, was given to the district court, and today, is
given to the family court. This rule also applies to the recognized Christian and Druze communities.
Even though Justice Cheshin ruled that he was diminishing
the authority of the Shari'ah Courts, he further added:
[A]s stated, we are required to decide regarding the Abu
Angele ruling... we may leave the matter as requiring further
deliberation, and content ourselves provisionally with the posing of the questions. As we will presently see, the mother has
not requested that we set aside the Abu Angele rule; she can
find her solution in the ruling itself and its interpretation as
being binding within its legitimate parameters, but not in
deviation therefrom.5 8
In at least three other areas examined below, the Shari'ah Appeals Court unsuccessfully attempted to broaden the jurisdiction
of the Shari'ah Courts.
A. Succession
The first example of the Shari'ah Court's struggle to
broaden its jurisdiction in relation to the civil courts relates to an
53.
Meron,
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See C.A. 90/3077, Plonit et al. v. Plonit, 49(2) P.D. 578.
The Law of Shtuki in Islamic Law, 46 HAPRAKLIT 407 (1997).
See Plonit, 49(2) P.D. at 619.
Id. at 620.
See Id. at 625.
Id.
Id. at 595.

See also, Ya'akov
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inheritance matter. 59 A decedent passed away in 1960, and in
1988, respondents submitted an application to the Shari'ah
Court for a probate order declaring succession. The question
confronting the Appeals Court was whether the Shari'ah Court
had jurisdiction when a decedent had passed away prior to the
adoption of the Succession Law6" and an application for a succession order was submitted after the law's adoption. The Court
could have either applied the law as applicable prior to the
adoption of the law (under Section 157 of the Succession Law)
or, pursuant to Section 155, it could have authorized the religious courts to do so, "if all of the relevant parties under this law
have given their written consent."61

The Shari'ah Appeals Court judgment, written by Qadi Farouk Zoebi, ruled that the Shari'ah Court had jurisdiction over
matters involving a person who passed away prior to 1965, and
that there was no need for written consent from the parties because prior to that year, the Shari'ah Court had jurisdiction.
The judgment was then appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court
in H.C. 2117/99, Mansoor v. Central Taiba Shari'ah Court, 54(1)
P.D. 211.62 Sitting as the High Court of Justice, the Court relied
upon C.A. 734/90, Zobidat v. Zobidat, 46(1) P.D. 749,63 and concluded that Section 157 relates to the substantive rights of decedents and their successors, rather than to their procedural
rights, including the rules relating to jurisdiction in succession
matters. It further held that the determining date for jurisdiction is not the date of death, but rather the date at which the
application was submitted for a succession order. In this case
there had been no written agreement of all the parties concerned. As a result, the High Court regarded the Succession Order and ensuing decision invalid.
B. Child Custody
With respect to child custody, prior to Amendment No. 5 of
the Family Court Law, the Shari'ah Court in Israel had exclusive
jurisdiction, provided that all of the parties were Muslim. In a
59.
60.
61.
62.

See A. 233/98 (Oct. 1, 1999).
Succession Law, 1965 S.H. 63.
See id.at § 155.
See H.C. 2117/99, Hasan Mansoor v. Central Taiba Shari'ah Court, 54(1) P.D.

211.
63. C.A. 734/90 Zobidat et al. v. Zobidat, 46(1) P.D. 749.
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custody dispute between a Christian mother and a Muslim father, 64 the Shari'ah Appeals Court ruled that the children belonged to the Muslim religion, and therefore custody went to the
parent of that faith. This went against the ruling in the matter of
H.C. 304/86 Barak v. Shari'ah Court Jaffa, 41(2) P.D. 745,6 in
which Justice Shamgar held that the exclusive interest to be considered is the best interest of the child. The Shari'ah Appeals
Court ruled that the child's best interests dictate that only his
religion be taken into consideration, and that since the issue
concerned Muslim children, the Shari'ah Court had jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation with the case of
C.M. 1421/97 Abu Ras Tibi v. Abu Ras Tibi, 53(1) P.D. 823, ruling
that, "we cannot accept [the] ruling of the Shari'ah Appeals
Court in relation to the Yael Barak ruling[.] ' ' 6" Further, "where
parents of a child who is the subject of a custody suit belong to
different religions, there is no longer exclusive jurisdiction for
the Shari'ah Court, and an application must be submitted under
Section 55 of the Order in Council (opening section). The same
applies in the case before us."6 7 The Supreme Court's conclusion is that in future similar cases, an application must be made
to the President of the Supreme Court, who then decides upon
the appropriate forum under Section 55 (opening part) of the
P.O.I.C.68

C. Waqfs69

The issue of Islamic endowments [waqfs] does not relate exclusively to Islamic law, its application, or the jurisdiction of
Shari'ah Courts or civil courts; it is principally concerned with
land disputes. However, the Islamic movement made the struggle over endowments an important element of its political activity,7 ° using it as leverage to enhance the status of the Islamic organizations. The Shari'ah Court, too, utilizes the issue of Islamic
64. A. 135/96 DXK (June 26, 1997).
65. H.C. 304/86 Yael Barak v. Shari'ah Court Jaffa et al., 41(2) P.D. 745, 750.
66. C.M. 1421/97 Mahmud Abu Ras Tibi v. Alina Abu Ras Tibi, 53(1) P.D. 823,
830.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See supra note 14.
70. See Salih Lotfi, Alharaki alislamiyafi alkhat alakhdar, I SHUOUN DUWALVA 49, 6569 (1994); Yaniv Yaakov, The Islamic Movement in Israel: Between Isolation and Integration,
in MAOF UMAASEH BEMICHLELET ACHIA 156, 163-64 (1998).
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endowments as a tool for enhancing its own status. As such, the
matter of jurisdiction over waqfs became particularly important
for the Shari'ah Appeals Court, considering the past involvement of qadis in granting fatwas7 1 validating transactions made
with respect to a particular Islamic endowment.7 2 This was the
background of the judgment given on December 31, 1995 by
Qadi Zoebi.7 3

In this judgment, the Appellants, beneficiaries of an endowment, filed an application before the Shari'ah Court in Jaffa
against the Guardian of Absentee Property,74 requesting a submission of accounts regarding a private waqf from which they
were benefiting. The appellants claimed that the Shari'ah Court
had jurisdiction over the matter, which the Guardian for Absentee Property disputed. The Shari'ah Court in Jaffa rejected the
claim, citing lack ofjurisdiction. The beneficiaries of the endowment appealed to the Shari'ah Appeals Court, again arguing for
jurisdiction, and as described below, the Shari'ah Appeals Court
used the judgment as a forum for expanding its authority.
1. Ascribing Different Meanings to Waqf Sahih and
Waqf gir Sahih
The Shari'ah Appeals Court ascribed different meanings to
the term waqfsahih and waqf gir sahih. According to the Court,
waqfsahih is a legally created endowment. Waqfgir sahih accord75
ing to this definition becomes a waqf that is not created legally.
Accordingly, a Shari'ah Court is authorized to deal with any legal
waqf This interpretation differs from the standard interpretation of the differences between waqf sahih and waqf gir sahih. To
ascertain whether the endowment is waqfsahih or waqf gir sahih,
there must be a determination as to whether the endowment was
dedicated on mulk land. 76 If the waqf was dedicated on full property land the waqf will be sahih [legal], and fall under the juris71. Afatwa is a non-binding opinion given in accordance with the Muslim Law.
72. See DUMPER, supra note 28, at 25-62.
73. D. 85/95 (Dec. 31, 1995).
74. The Guardian of Absentee Property is the Israeli institution responsible for
administrating the property of Palestinians who left their homes for an area of Palestine
that was not occupied by Jewish forces on November 28, 1948. See Alisa Rubin Peled,
Towards Autonomy? The Islamist Movement's Quest for Control of Islamic Institutions in Israel,
55 MIDDLE E. J. 378, n.37 (2001), available at 2001 'WIL15732145.
75. Gir is the Arabic equivalent of "not."
76. Mulk land is full property land.

20031

RISE AND CRISIS

diction of a Shari'ah Court. On the contrary, if the waqf was
dedicated on land that is not classified as full property, the waqf
will be classified as waqfgir sahih.7 7
2. The Shari'ah Courts' Jurisdiction to Deal with Ijaratin7 8
Under an order issued in 1921, the Shari'ah Court is not
authorized to deal with matters related to ijaratin, except with
the unanimous approval of the Supreme Muslim Committee.7 9
Though the Qadis Law repealed the 1921 Order,8 0 the repeal did
not alter the initial restriction of jurisdiction. 8
3. The Shari'ah Court's Authorization to Adjudicate Under
the Absentees Property Law
Qadi Zoebi stated that the Shari'ah Court is authorized to
adjudicate in accordance with the Absentees Property Law. He
found authority for this in H.C. 1000/92, Bavli v. Rabbinical
Court, 48 (2) P.D. 221: "Indeed the religious court forms an integral part of the Israeli Judicial System ... [and the law] which
it applies is an integral part of the Israeli legal system ....
82
Qadi Zoebi further stated that in matters of personal status he
would rule according to Shari'ah law, and that in other matters
he would adjudicate according to positive law. This was the basis
for his conclusion that the Shari'ah Court was authorized to adjudicate cases dealing with the Absentees Property Law. Despite
the conventional understanding that the Supreme Court ruling
in Bavli limits the jurisdiction of the religious courts, 3 the
77. Aharon Layish, The Muslim Waqf in Israel, 2 ASIAN & AFR. STUD. 40, 45-46
(1966).
78. jaratin means a double lease. The administrator of the waqf leases a waqf
property and receives a lump sum that is equivalent to the value of the property plus an
additional minor sum paid on a periodic basis. This aims to present the transaction as
that of a lease and not of a sale.
79. See Order of the 20th of December, 1921, Art. 8(2) (1921), in 2 LEGIStATION OF PALESTINE, supra note 16, at 398. The Shari'ah Courts shall not take any action affecting
waqf of the nature of Hikr [rent on a long-term lease], Ijaratin and Istibdal [an exchange, in this case, of property], except with the unanimous consent of the Council.
Id.
80. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
81. For discussion of this point, see Ya'akov Meron, Jurisdictionin Matters of Waqf,
32 HAPRAKLIT, 144-46 (1978).
82. H.C. 1000/92, Bavli v. Rabbinical Court, 48 (2) P.D. 221.
83. See Halperin-Kadri, supra note 43, at 110 (noting that in legal literature, Bavli
and H.C. 3914/92, Lev v. Reg'l Rabbinical Ct., Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, 48(2) P.D. 491, are regarded as the judgments that establish "institutional judicial imperialism," in the sense
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Shari'ah Appeals Court ultimately applied it in a manner that
broadened their jurisdiction.
The High Court of Justice did not accept the interpretation
of the Shari'ah Appeals Court, and on petition did not substantively deal with any of the issues or arguments raised by the
Court. s 4 The High Court ruled that Amendment Three of the
Absentees Property Law 5 removed the basis forjurisdiction over
the endowment within the meaning of Section 52. It thereby
concluded that the jurisdiction previously belonging to the
Shari'ah Court, had now been transferred to the Guardian for
Absentees Property. Reading between the lines of the case law, it
is clear that the judgments reflect a fundamental, principled
struggle between the Supreme Court and the Shari'ah Appeals
Court.
In the three cases examined, the attempts made by the Appeals Court to expand its authority in relation to the civil courts
failed. The rulings also indicate an internal struggle within the
Shari'ah Appeals Court itself, between Qadi Natur and Qadi
Zoebi. In the third case, Qadi Zoebi attempted to write material
that could weigh against Qadi Natur in the matter of endowments, about which Qadi Natur had written a legal circular in
1994.6
III. THE STRENGTHENING OF THE POSITION OF THE
SHARIAH APPEALS COURT IN RELATION TO THE
REGIONAL SHARJ'AH COURTS
As opposed to its unsuccessful attempt to broaden its jurisdiction in relation to the State of Israel's civil courts, the
Shari'ah Appeals Court succeeded in strengthening its position
in relation to the subordinate regional Shari'ah Courts."7 There
are four legal factors that strengthened its position, the first of
which is external to the Shari'ah Court itself.
of making civil norms applicable to all judicial instances, including the Shar'iah Court,
functioning in the same framework).
84. H.C. 6452/96, Guardian for Absentee Property v. Shari'ah Appeals Court,
55(4) P.D. 363.
85. Absentee Property (Amendment No. 3) Law, (Release and Use of Endowment
Property) 1965.
86. See infra, at Section VII for discussion on this circular.
87. There are seven regional Shari'ah Courts in Israel sitting in Beersheva, Jaffa,
Taybe, Nazareth, Haifa, Jerusalem, and Acco. In each court there is one qadi. Although
the Shari'ah Courts are state courts, they sit in buildings separate from the civil courts.
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A. Permanent Appointments to the Shari'ah Appeals Court

With the establishment of the State of Israel, the members
of the Supreme Muslim Council left the country and the State
did not appoint replacements. Instead, the Israeli Minister of
Religion appointed qadis to serve in the different Shari'ah
Courts under the Qadis (Approval of Appointments) Law.88
While this law approved both the establishment of the courts
and the appointment of qadis, it did not prescribe the method of
appointing new qadis. Statutory regulation was suspended until
the Qadis Law of 1961, which repealed the British High Commissioner's Order that had established the Supreme Muslim Council, 9 and empowered the President of the State to appoint qadis
in accordance with the proposals of the Appointments Committee.9" The Committee would consist of nine members, the majority of whom would be Muslim.9 1
Until 1953 there was no Shari'ah Appeals Court. Deputy
Minister for Religious Affairs, Z. Werhaftig gave the following explanation for its absence:
[A] particular difficulty has emerged with respect to the
Court of Appeals. As I explained, we do not have many qadis
in Israel - four all together. They are definitely capable of
dealing with all of the current matters. However, the establishment of an Appeals Court raises difficulties. The current
situation is that men of religion, experts or professionals in
this particular area, are particularly rare in the State of Israel,
and clearly it is impossible to import experts from neighbor
states. Israel has no appropriate educational facilities for
training this kind of expert, which is the source of the lack of
candidates for the appointment. This severely impaired the
actions of the Appeals Court, but having recognized the need
for such a court, we have established another basis: an appeal
will be presented before an expanded panel of qadis, who did
not participate in the issuing of the judgment which is being
appealed. Given that under Islamic Law, each qadi hears
88. Qadis (Approval of Appointments) Law S.H. (Dec. 17, 1953).
89. Qadis Law of 1961, § 25 (1961).
90. Id. at § 3.
91. The Appointments Committee is composed as follows: (1) Two qadis chosen
by the Qadis Board to serve for a period of three years; (2) the Minister of Religion and
another member of the government appointed by it; (3) three members of the Knesset,
of whom at least two are Muslims and chosen by the Knesset; and (4) two advocates, at
least one of whom is Muslim. Id.
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cases by himself, then the appeal against ajudgment given by
a qadi can be brought before
an expanded tribunal, compris92
ing three qadis or more.
Section 3 of the Qadis Law confirms the establishment of the
Shari'ah Appeals Court retroactively, from January 1, 1953. It
also confirms that the qadis who are to serve on the Appeals
Court would be assigned from the qadis currently serving in the
various regional Shari'ah Courts.9 3 Section 6 of the Qadis Law
establishes a new position: the Head of the Shari'ah Appeals
Court. This appointment can be for a particular period or permanent.9 4 At the end of 1994, however, there was a permanent
appointment of three qadis to the Shari'ah Appeals Court for the
first time: Farouk Zoebi, Zachi Madlaj and Ahmad Natur, Head
of the Court.9 5 The granting of permanent appointments
strengthened the hierarchy of the Shari'ah Appeals Court. Its
absence in the past meant that there was no difference between
rulings of the Appeals Court and those of the regional courts
since the appellate decisions were made by the qadis still serving
at the regional court level. Accordingly, when Aharon Layish examined the rulings of the Shari'ah Courts in Israel prior to the
permanent appointments, he made no distinction between qadis
serving on the regional courts and those serving on the Shari'ah
Appeals Court.9 6
B. ProcessingFiles Transferred Between Courts
The Shari'ah Appeals Court has jurisdiction over processing
all files transferred between regional courts. The processing is
evaluative, rather than technical. For example, any decision to
disqualify a regional qadi must be assessed by the Shari'ah Appeals Court. If one of the litigants applies to have a regional qadi
disqualified or if the qadi decides to recuse himself, then the decision or the application comes before the Shari'ah Appeals
92. Knesset Protocols, 3rd Session of the 2nd Knesset, § 15 at 40 (1953).
93. Sheikh Tahar Al Tabri was appointed on Jan. 19, 1950 to the Shari'ah Court in
the Middle Area; Sheikh Mussa Al Tabri was appointed as a qadi to the court injaffa on
Sept. 9, 1948; Sheikh Tahar Hamad was appointed to the Shari'ah Court in Jaffa;
Sheikh Hassan Amin Habash was appointed as a qadi in the Shari'ah Court in Nazareth
on Aug. 15, 1948.
94. Permanent appointment requires the approval of the Appointments Committee.
95. Official Publications 4268, at 1010 (Dec. 18, 1994).
96. See generally LAnSH, supra note 20.
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Court. Where the position of a serving qadi is not filled, the Appeals Court decides where to refer the claim. 7 There are two
exceptions to this rule: when the parties have initially agreed to
litigate before the Court; and when following the session, the
parties agree to transfer the file to another court. 98
C. Establishing the Principle of Binding Precedent
The principle of binding precedent is a major feature of the
Anglo-Saxon legal system,9 9 and its adoption by the Israeli judicial system conferred to the Supreme Court a central role in the
development and the creation of common law.' 0 Even if Islamic law can come to terms with the existence of an appeals
court, 0 ' on the substantive level Islamic law does not recognize
the principle of binding precedent." 2 In Islamic law, the qadi's
judgment does not constitute a source of Islamic Law, and is
therefore not binding. Each qadi must decide anew each case
presented to him, without the mandatory guidance of previous
decisions. The Shari'ah Appeals Court, however, has ruled that
its precedents are binding, contrary to traditional Islamic juris97. See, e.g., A. 4/98-18 (Feb. 11, 1998); A. 69 (Apr. 23, 2000).
98. A. 151/98 (Sept. 14, 1998).
99. RENE DAVID & CAMILLE JAUFFRET-SPINOSI, LES GRANDS SYSTEMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS 46, 156-58, 425-26 (1988).
100. Binding precedent is a source of law, and thus impacts the system as a whole.
See GAD TADESCHI, THE RULE OF THE BINDING PRECEDENT, RESEARCH IN OUR LAw 92
(1959).
101. Claims were made regarding classical Islamic law's rejection of the Appeals
Court, in the sense of rejecting an appeals forum that occupies a higher position in the
hierarchy than the first instance, and which can alter and reverse the decisions of the
first instance. For a presentation of these claims on the normative level, and on the
factual and historical levels, see David S. Powers, On Judicial Review in Islamic Law, 26
LAw & Soc'y REV. 315, 315-41 (1992); Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Appellate Review and
JudicialIndependence in Islamic Law, in ISLAM AND PUBLIC LAw: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY STUDIES 49-83 (Chibli Mallat ed., 1993).
102. MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE 149-50 (1984); N.J.
Coulson, The State and the Individual in Islamic Law, 6 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 49, 49-60
(1957); Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and the
Theary of Legal Change, 42 AM J. COmP. L. 233, 264 n.22 (1994); COLIN IMBER, EBU'SSU'UD: THE ISLAMIC LEGAL TRADITION 7, 39 (1997); HerbertJ. Liebesny, Comparative
Legal Histoiy: Its Role in the Analysis of Islamic and Modern NearEastern Legal Institutions, 20
AM. J. COMP. L. 38, 44 (1972); Badr Gamal Moursi, Islamic Law: Its Relation to OtherLegal
Systems, 26 AMJ. COMP. L. 187, 189 (1978);JORGEN S. NIELSEN, SECULAR JUSTICE IN AN
ISLAMIC STATE: MAZALIM UNDER THE BAHRI MAMLUKS 113, 662, 1264-789, 1387 (1985);
Y. LINANT DE BELLEFONDS, TRAITE DE DROIT MUSULMAN COMPARE: THEORIE GENERALE
DE L'ACTEJURIDIQUE 27-28 (1965); ABDL KARIM ZIDAN, NIZAM AL-QADA' Fi AL-SHARI'A[H]
AL-ISLAMIVA 269-70 (1995).
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prudence. Introducing the principle of binding precedent
strengthened the Court's position. It also shows the influence of
Israeli law upon decisions of the Shari'ah qadis, since the principle of binding precedent is connected to the Israeli legal system,
but is not recognized by all legal systems.' 013
The case law introduction of binding precedent only occurred after some hesitation. In a July 23, 1996 ruling, Qadi
Zoebi, with Qadi Assalia's consent, stated:
[D]ecisions of the Shari'ah Appeals Court in matters of personal status are not binding for other cases, for matters of
personal status are different, no file resembles another given
the differences in their facts. Consequently, the decisions of
the Shari'ah Appeals Court do not bind any other court except for the Shari'ah Court to whom the appeal decision is
addressed. 104
In a later decision by Qadi Natur and concurred with by Qadis
Zoebi and Zachi Madlaj,' 1 5 Qadi Natur ruled on a law that binds
the decisions of the Shari'ah Appeals Court on the particular
court to which they are addressed. He suggested qualifying the
application of that law, finding it preferable that the regional
courts follow the footsteps of the judicial principles fixed by the
Shari'ah Appeals Court. He argued that this promotes stability
in adjudication and is beneficial for litigants. Accordingly, he
suggested limiting the application of the ruling from July 23,
1996, and stated that as a rule, where the circumstances are similar, there is an obligation to comply with the judicial principles
fixed by the Shari'ah Appeals Court.
D. InformationalRequirements of Regional Courts to the
Appeals Court
In a ruling by Qadi Zoebi with the consent of Qadi Assalia, 0 6
the Court held that Section 7 of the Shari'ah Court's Regulations 1918-1925, requires the regional Shari'ah Court to send a
103. The principle of binding precedent is not accepted in all of the continental
systems of law. For example, in France, the decisions of the Cour de Cassation [France's
Supreme Court of Appeals] do not establish rules in the abstract sense of being binding
upon courts in other cases confronted with similar facts; the court's decisions are binding exclusively upon the parties themselves.
104. A. 96/41 (July 23, 1996).
105. A. 97/39 (May 15, 1997).
106. A. 54/00 (July 24, 2000).
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copy of a judgment to the Shari'ah Appeals Court for the confirmation of any decision regarding a minor, even if the decision
goes against a child's interest. The regional courts, however,
have failed to comply with this regulation, even after the ruling
of the Shari'ah Appeals Court. The Appeals Court's decision,
though, ignores a Supreme Court ruling that Shari'ah religious
courts are not required to submit their decisions regarding endowment disputes to the appellate courts for confirmation. In
my view, the logic guiding the Supreme Court regarding endowments should be equally applicable in the context of decisions
concerning minors, even though the Supreme Court ruling did
not relate specifically to the approval of the Shari'ah Appeals
Court.0 7 This decision of the Shari'ah Appeals Court causes a
delay in proceedings, and the attitude of the Appeals Court to
the regional courts regarding minors appears to be similar to
that of a parent worrying about his children.
IV. STRENGTHENING THE SYMBOLIC STANDING OF
THE COURTS
The Shari'ah Appeals Court has also strengthened its symbolic standing by changing its writing style. Recent judgments
are now longer and more substantively reasoned than similar
judgments from the sixties and seventies. During those periods,
judgments usually ranged from half a page to a page in length;
today, judgments may be up to ten pages in length. The
Shari'ah Appeals Court also instructs the regional courts to be
precise when citing verses from the Qur'an, 8 to demonstrate
the Court's knowledge of the Qur'an. Qadi Natur tends to refer
to the classical sources of Islamic law, while Qadi Zoebi rarely
does so. Both Qadi Natur and Qadi Zoebi cite sources from Hebrew and English, which indicates their broad erudition. The
writing style of the judgments is now more authoritative, and
one can also discern a hierarchical tone.
The Head of the Shari'ah Appeals Court is now known as
the President of the Shari'ah Appeals Court. This title, conferred by the Law on Qadis (Modification No. 10) 2002, lends
107. C.A. 3997/91 Trustee Committee for Muslim Waqf Assets v. Yossi Investments
Co. Ltd. et al., 49(5) P.D. 766.
108. A. 54/99 (May 4, 1999).
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greater prestige to the position.19 Additionally, the Shari'ah Appeals Court became known as the High Shari'ah Appeals Court,
or the Supreme Shari'ah Appeals Court. The alternate usage of
titles has even penetrated the rulings of the Supreme Court."'
Jerusalem became known as "Al-Quds Alsharif," a symbol of Palestinian pride, appropriated by the institutions of the State of
Israel."' Prior to 1994, the qadi was called "Sheikh," literally
"old man," however, the word denoted someone who was knowl-

109. Beyond mere honorary attributes, this law also confirms certain powers that
were already exercised before its enactment. The Qadis Law (No.10) enhances this
trend by allowing appeals regarding the disqulification of a qadi to be heard by the
President of the Shari'ah Court of Appeals. Another case in which Qadi Natur gave a
written decision on his own involved an application for the transfer of a file from one
court to another; the qadi desired to disqualify himself from dealing with the case because one party did not give the requisite respect to the court. See A. 254/2000 (Nov. 8,
2000). An additional case concerned an attorney of the litigants who happened to be
the son of the qadi of the local court. A. 2444/2000 (Nov. 8, 2000). In another case,
there was a vacancy for a qadi in the court, and no qadi was appointed; therefore, there
was a request to transfer the case to another court. A. 233/2 (Nov. 1, 2000); A. 238/
2000 (Nov. 1, 2000); A. 190/2000 (Sept. 21, 2000); A. 189/2000 (Sept. 21, 2000); 179/
2000 (Sept. 21, 2000). In another case, Qadi Natur cancelled the disqualification of a
qadi who had recused himself because the Plaintiff's grandfather had worked as a secretary in the court. In Natur's view, this did not constitute grounds for disqualification.
A. 232/2000 (Nov. 1, 2000). In another case Natur confirmed the disqualification of a
qadi who had spoken to one of the litigants prior to the court session in which the claim
was to be heard. A. 229/2000 (Nov. 1, 2000). Furthermore, upon application by a
party, transfer of venue from one court to another can be made unilaterally by the
President. Id. However, it seems that there is no confirmation of previous decisions
unilaterally adopted by him. In addition, this same Article 8 gives the President competence to deliver temporary orders. This amendment, Qadis Law No. 10, enhances the
power of the President of Shari'ah Appeals Court. One should note that Natur, the
current president of Shari'ah Appeals Court, is a powerful person in the Shari'ah administrative network. He acquired power and influence by teaching Islamic law in colleges and universities and donating scholarships to Arab students. Qadi Natur is the
head of the committee that tests candidates to become Shari'ah attorneys, and he is a
highly influential member of the committee for the appointment of qadis. In effect, he
controls Islamic law, the system which determines the Shari'ah attorneys, the system
that appoints the Shari'ah judges, and the Shari'ah Appeals Court. What is strange is
that he does not have a formal Shari'ah education and his knowledge of Israeli law is
not always up to date. See Abou Ramadan supra note 10, at 652 n.190.
110. The Supreme Court refers to the Court as the "Shari'ah Court of Appeals,"
apparently on the basis of the translation of the judgment before the Supreme Court.
See H.C. 2117/99, Mansoor at 213. It has also been referred to as "The Supreme
Shari'ah Court of Appeals." See C.M. 1421/97, Abu Ras Tibi at 828.
111. For a useful comparison on this issue, see Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism,
22 LAw & So(c'y REv. 869, 882 (1988) (noting that "[slymbolic appropriation works the
other way around as well: state law may borrow the symbols of other normative orders").
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edgeable in religious matters' 12 Similarly, Sheikh was used as a
term for qadis of the Shari'ah Courts, but it has fallen out of use
since 1994, with the permanent appointments to the Appeals
Court. No distinction is made now between the judge of a religious court and the judge of a civil court. Furthermore, with the
permanent appointment of the three qadis to the Appeals Court,
the old custom of writing the judgments of the Shari'ah Courts
in sijill [booklets] has fallen out of use. Finally, even the dress
code has changed. The Shari'ah qadi of old strictly wore the
traditional garb, whereas the modern qadi wears a Western-style
suit.
V. STRENGTHENING THE SHARI'AH APPEALS COURT IN
RELATION TO ISRAELI LAW
The Shari'ah Appeals Court attempted to strengthen its position vis-d-vis Israeli law in two conflicting ways, attesting to its
ambivalence regarding Israeli law. The Shari'ah Appeals Court
forbids the regional Shari'ah Courts from relying on positive Israeli law, while relying on Israeli law to broaden its authority.
A. Prohibition of Reliance Upon Israeli Legislation
The religious courts in Israel are supposed to apply religious
law, but where the legislature also refers to secular law, the religious courts must comply with the laws of the State (a territorial
law). 1 3 For example, the Shari'ah Appeals Court ruled in one
case 1 4 that had the case not concerned child support for a minor, it would have set aside the regional court's ruling as it had
done in many other cases, because the court had relied upon the
Family Law Amendment"' instead of Shari'ah law. The Appeals
Court ruled:
[I] t should be mentioned that the civil law relied upon by the
112. During the Ottoman Period, the Sheikh al-Islam, who was in charge of the
supervision of the religious Muslim hierarchy, was responsible for the appointment of
qadis. See EISENMAN, supra note 16, at 32.
113. See Menashe Shava, Is a Religious Court's Diversionfrom or Disregardof a Provision
of SecularLaw Directed Specifically to it, the Same as Deviationfrom Authority?, 28 HAPRAKLIT,
299-316 (on whether the classification of the disregard of a substantive provision of this
nature constitutes an act which is ultra vires, or a mistake in law); see also H.C. 1000/92,
Bavli, 48(2) P.D. at 221.
114. A. 191/97 (Dec. 29, 1997).
115. Family Law (Amendment), 1959, S.H.
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lower court regarding temporary maintenance is unrelated to
the law applied by Shari'ah Court[s]. The lower court's ruling does not apply to Muslims, given that the Shari'ah Court
is prohibited from ruling in accordance with laws that are not
and must only rule in accordance
grounded in Islamic Law,
6
with the Shari'ah law."
The Court's argument is odd because the State law concerned is
the same State law that provides the legality for all actions of the
Shari'ah Courts.' 1 7 Furthermore, the Shari'ah Appeals Court
has ruled in numerous judgments that the Capacity and Guardianship Law," 8 which orders the courts to take into account the
principle of the best interest of the child, does not apply to the
Shari'ah Courts. As Qadi Natur has ruled: "[t] he Shari'ah Court
must not rely upon the Capacity and Guardianship Law [of]
1962. We have clarified this on numerous occasions, that the
noble Shari'ah constituted a complete judicial system before it
(the Capacity and Guardianship Law), and will remain such after
it, and the Shari'ah does not require any positive secular
rules." 19

The Shari'ah Appeals Court has also ruled that the Israeli
Rules of Procedure do not apply to the Shari'ah Court, and that
the authority of the Shari'ah Courts to prevent exit or to cancel
such stay derives from Islamic law and -not from Israeli procedural law. 2 ° The Shari'ah Court did not hesitate to apply this principle to the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty ("Basic
Law"), 2 ' when it ruled that the Basic Law was not applicable in
116. A. 191/97 (Dec. 29, 1997).
117. It is worthy to quote the Supreme Court of Israel from a case that actually
dealt with the Rabbinical Courts because the State status of the Shari'ah Appeals Court
is identical to that of the Rabbinical Courts:
The Rabbinical Court was established by legislation and is legislatively-based;
its budget comes from the treasury and the Dayanim (Jewish religious judges]
receive their salaries like all other State employees; they preside in judgment
under the State emblem and their decisions appear on official stationery.
Their orders become the voice of the State and it is the State that enforces
them ....

[T]he Rabbinical Court only has the powers that are statutorily

conferred upon it.
H.C. 3269/95, Katz v. Jerusalem Regional Rabbinical Court, 50(4) P.D. 590, 604.
118. Capacity and Guardianship Law, 1962, S.H. 380.
119. A. 55/2001 (Apr. 29, 2001).
120. A. 194/99 (Nov. 22, 1999).
121. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391 [hereinafter Basic
Law]. The Basic Law is a basis for human rights in Israel and declares support for the
rights to life, personal liberty, privacy, and dignity among others. Id.
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the Shari'ah Courts. 122 There is no clear ruling on this matter,
however, and it would seem that according to the High Court of
Justice, 12 - the tendency is to apply the Basic Law in the religious
courts:
I have dealt with the whole gallery of general principles in the
framework of which procedural jurisdiction (legislative or inherent) should be exercised. Sometimes these principles all
point in the same direction, but sometimes they are in internal conflict. Procedural justice and procedural efficiency
point in different directions. Both of them may point in directions which are at odds with the direction indicated by
human rights. In such cases there is no escaping striking a
balance between the conflicting values. In the framework of
this balance, special significance should be given to considerations of human rights. This is especially true today, with1 the
24
adoption of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.
B. Using the Theory of InherentJurisdiction
The first method used by the Shari'ah Appeals Court to
avoid resorting to Israeli legislation is to use court rulings
adopted in relation to the religious courts. The second method
is to use the theory of inherent jurisdiction.
Israeli case law recognized that in certain cases, jurisdiction
exists even without explicit authorization for the civil courts or
religious courts. This occurs when jurisdiction is required to allow the judicial forums to properly discharge their functions.
This jurisdiction may be either independent or complimen25

tary: 1

[T]he term "inherentjurisdiction" and the like is used for the
capacity of the Court in appropriate cases to create either
procedural tools, or tools commanding compliance, by way of
contempt of court. These rules are created to protect the
court in its functional-institutional capacity, to ensure that its
proceedings are not abused and for the prevention of obvious
injustice, which may ensue from the prescription of [a] time
122. A. 194/99 (Nov. 22, 1999) (confirming the ruling given in the judgment of
247/98).
123. H.C. 3914/92, Leah Lev v. Reg'l Rabbinical Ct., Tel-Aviv-Jaffa et al., 48(2)
P.D. 491.
124. Id.
125. See Pinchas Goldstein, "InherentJurisdiction"of the Court, 10(1) IYUNEI MISHPAT
37 (1984).
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12 6
period for doing any action under a judgment.

For example, in the Israeli High Court of Justice case of H.C.
1912/97, Resh v. Council of Chief Rabbinate of Israel, 52(3) P.D.
650,127 Justice Dorner ruled:
Legislative history indicates that the law did not establish procedures for the Rabbinical Court, and no authority was empowered to make them. In this state of affairs, the Rabbinical
Courts themselves have such authority. The source of this authority is in the inherent jurisdiction conferred upon any legally constituted forum, for which procedures, or modes for
their enactment were not statutorily established. They may
initiate their own procedures 12for
operation, in order to en8
able them to fulfill their role.
The Shari'ah Court has relied on this jurisdiction without
citing the relevant ruling, to broaden its authority in all matters
relating to temporary measures. The Shari'ah Appeals Court
noted that there was no term for "clarifying a judgment" in the
Shari'ah procedures. However, by virtue of the "inherent jurisdiction of the Shari'ah Appeals Court it can clarify a decision
when there is [a] printing error, punctuation, deletion, or inadvertent addition," provided that an application was filed within a
reasonable period. 129 In the same manner, by virtue of its inherent jurisdiction, the Shari'ah Appeals Court can give the same
decisions that the regional Shari'ah Courts were empowered to
30
give. 1
The scope of inherent jurisdiction which the Shari'ah Appeals Court purports to have is broader than the scope contemplated by the concept of "inherent jurisdiction" as recognized by
the Supreme Court. Qadi Zoebi used two methods for broadening its scope: the first was the combination of incidental jurisdic126. Id. at 39-40.
127. H.C. 1912/97, Zvi Resh v. Council of Chief Rabbinate of Israel et al., 52(3)
P.D. 650.
128. See id. Furthermore, in the Lev ruling, the Deputy President (as then referred
to) wrote: "[I]n my opinion, in the absence of statutory empowerment to that effect,
the authority to establish procedures rests with the Rabbinical Courts themselves. The
source of this empowerment is in the inherent jurisdiction of any judicial forum to
determine its own procedures." See Lev 48(2) P.D. 491 (citing to H.C. 364/85, Pachar
Aldrin v. Druze Ct. in Jerusalem, 40(3) P.D. 699, 704). See also H.C. 2222/99, Agzal
(Ora) Gabai v. Rabbinical Ct. App., 54(5) P.D. 401, 424.
129. See A. 99/144 (Mar. 14, 2000).
130. See A. 5/00 (July 17, 2000).
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tion and inherent jurisdiction. In a December 31, 1995 ruling,
Qadi Zoebi ruled that Section 76 of the Court's Law confers incidental jurisdiction to the Shari'ah Courts in the same manner as
it confers incidental jurisdiction to civil courts.3 3 Accordingly,
when an ancillary matter that is not within the Shari'ah Court's
jurisdiction comes before it with a main matter that is within its
jurisdiction, the court may rule on the ancillary matter so long as
a decision in the ancillary matter is necessary to decide the main
matter. Incidental jurisdiction was originally intended only for
the civil courts, but the Shari'ah Appeals Court adopted it in
order to expand its jurisdiction, employing the same rationale
used for establishing inherent jurisdiction.
The second method used by Qadi Zoebi to broaden the theory of inherent jurisdiction was illustrated in a judgment dated
December 17, 2000:
[The] court has inherent jurisdiction not only in the absence
of legislation relating to the procedural matter or to jurisdiction, but also when there is such legislation (which is not derived from the Divine Legislation or the Sunnah of the
Prophet, but rather by positive legislation) and which does
not answer the needs of the period, and is not commensurate
13 2
with the values ofjustice and mercy and general order.
Here it is apparent that the Shari'ah Appeals Court understands
inherent jurisdiction as being synonymous with natural law,
which precedes positive law. In such a case the Shari'ah Appeals
Court has the authority to defy the law, even when there is an
explicit law stating otherwise. Qadi Zoebi discussed the example
of the non-use of mukhbirin [experts] in matters of alimony, even3
13
though Section 31 of the 1917 Shari'ah Procedures require it.
A second example is the liberalization of the time period for submitting appeals. This has been allowed, disregarding Section 8
of the Regulations for Shari'ah Court of Appeals, which provides
only a twenty day period in which one can appeal a decision of a
regional Shari'ah Court. A third case demonstrating inherent
jurisdiction concerned the determination of expenses in a manner that does not leave discretion to the Court. The Shari'ah
131. A. 85/95 (Dec. 31, 1995).
132. A. 2000/8, 94 (Qadi Zoebi & Qadi Ziad Aslia, concurring) (Dec. 17, 2000).
133. Law of Procedure of the Moslem Religious Courts of the 25th of October,
1333, A.H. § 31 (1917).
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Appeals Court, under Qadi Zoebi, did not see itself as being restricted by such a provision. It preferred using inherentjurisdiction as opposed to positive legislation. Such inherent jurisdiction would only "be used when the law contradicted the needs of
the period or is not appropriate to the principles of justice,
mercy and general order."' 3 4 It could be said that the Shari'ah
Appeals Court has its own normative hierarchy. At the top of the
pyramid are the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Beneath them are the
principles deriving from the "needs of the period, the principles
of justice, mercy and general order."13 These are followed by
positive legislation, which relates to the Islamic Law. The positive legislation is lex specialis and prevails over general civil legislation. At the bottom of the hierarchy is the general civil legislation. Within this normative hierarchy there is no place for the
Basic Law.
VI. STRENGTHENING THE SHARI'AH APPEALS COURT IN
RELATION TO LITIGANTS
The Shari'ah Appeals Court has attempted to gain the public's trust by use of the term 'justice." The Court established the
principle that justice must be seen,1" 6 and on that basis was prepared to grant an extension for filing an appeal when dictated
byjustice.13 7 The Shari'ah Appeals Court has also recently ruled
that the Shari'ah Courts represent "Islamic Justice."' 13 8
Further, it has made improvements in the following procedural matters to enhance its status as a just forum for litigants:
1) The right to appear before the Shari'ah Appeals Court:
According to Section 10 of the Regulations for the
Shari'ah Court of Appeals,1 39 there are no oral deliberations before the Appeals Court and the appeals are conducted by way of the parties' written pleadings. Despite
this section, there have been cases in which the Court
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See A. 28/94 Uune 14, 1994); A. 229/2000 (Nov. 1, 2000); A. 203/2000 (Sept.

21, 2000).
137. See A. 2001/21 (Jan. 30, 2001).
138. A. 2000/92 (June 7, 2000). See also A. 60/2001 (Jan. 18, 2001).
139. See Moslem Religious Courts, § 10 (Oct. 10, 1918), in 2 LEGISLATION OF PALESTINE,
supra note 16, at 461.
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summoned the parties before for oral deliberations, without determining the precise criteria for doing so.
2) Requiring qadis to provide the reasoning behind their decisions:

In a long series of judgments, the Shari'ah Appeals Court
has established that the regional Shari'ah
Courts must
1 40
state the reasons for their decisions.
3) The policy of refrainingfrom imposing expenses:

To encourage parties to restrict their appearances before
the Court to a minimum, the Shari'ah Appeals Court usually does not award expenses.14 1
However, together with the improvement of procedural
matters, the Shari'ah Appeals Court qadis were also aware that
42
litigants relate to the Court with a certain degree of contempt,1
and for this reason determined that the sanctions imposed by
civil legal organs are also applicable in the Appeals Court. In
one case, the Court lashed out at the litigants, referring to the
appeal that had been filed as "unprofessional."'4 3 The Court has
even gone so far as to criticize a Shari'ah attorney who represented a wife after he had represented her husband.'4 4 The
court ruled that the ethical rules binding advocates are applicable to Shari'ah attorneys by force of the Chamber of Advocates
Law, "4' 5 and the Court directed the administration of the Court
to transfer the file to the Attorney General.

VII. THE ATTEMPT TO WIN THE TRUST OF THE PUBLIC
AND THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT
The qadis attempted to appease the Muslim public and fem140. See e.g., A. 28/94 (June 14, 1994).
141. See A. 88/00, 89 C (June 11, 2000). In an exceptional judgment dated February 4, 2001, expenses were ruled for the sum of NIS 5000. NIS is the abbreviation for
Israel's national currency, the New Sheqel; in February 2001, one U.S. dollar was the
equivalent of NIS 4.1215. Bank of Israel, Representative Foreign-Currency Exchange
Rates, Average Rates for 2001, availableat http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/mth/
average/averg01 e.htm.
142. See A. 98/15 (Oct. 27, 1998).
143. See A. 95/93 C. (Nov. 7, 1995).
144. See A. 129/97 (Nov. 9, 1997) (Natur & Madlaj concurring).
145. This is a classic example of the numerous instances of inaccuracy of the
Shari'ah Appeals Court. The Chamber of Advocates Law applies to the Shari'ah Advocates Regulations, 1963, by virtue of Regulation 8, and not by virtue of the Chamber of
Advocates Law. The language of the Regulation is as follows: "A Shari'ah Attorney shall
operate for the good of his client in trust and devotion, and shall assist the Shari'ah
Court in dispensing justice. In the discharging of his duty he shall be subject, mutatis
mutandis to the rules of professional ethics applicable to advocates in Israel."
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inist organizations by distributing marasim [legal circulars].146
These marasim were signed by all of the qadis serving in Israel at
that time following the initiative of Qadi Natur.
The first marsum was directed at other qadis serving at that
time in the Shari'ah Courts and included directives that the
qadis are required to comply with as obligatory norms. The
Shari'ah Court relies upon the Maslaha as one of the sources of
Islamic law, and the Maslaha influenced the shaping of this marSUm.' 4 7 This first marsum intended to prevent the persistent expropriation of Muslims. Such expropriations were effected
when Shari'ah Courts had approved fatwas through which waqf
property was delivered to Israeli authorities. The approbation of
selling waqf properties through fatwas delivered by qadis severely
damaged the faith reposed by the Islamic community in the
Shari'ah system, and caused criticism of the Shari'ah Courts.
This circular uses the example of renting an asset that was endowed for a period of forty-eight years. Relying on the interest
of the umma,1 48 the circular directed the qadis not to issue fatwas
that permit acts against the endowment note, notwithstanding
the existence of legal opinions allowing such acts. This marsum
explains the prohibition as deriving from the fact that such acts
"do not serve the national interest," and prohibits sales, leases,
mortgages, bartering or granting permission for other use of an
endowment. The marsum instructs qadis to appoint guardians
for endowments and to review their activities on a twice-yearly
basis. Any action relating to the endowment must be registered.
The basic aim of the marsum is to achieve transparency of the
endowment's administration, and it also recognizes the principle
of freedom of information, stating that "Muslims have the right
to know about the condition of their endowment."
The second circular, "The Role of Mukhbirin in Matters of
Alimony," was published January 14, 1995. This second marsum
relies upon the "siyasah shar'iyah." In Islamic literature, this is a
discretion that is recognized as the source of the Imam's authority to regulate particular matters without contradicting the
146. The plural form is marasimand the singular is marsum. All three marasim are
on file with the author.
147. Maslaha refers to the consideration of "public interest." For a discussion on
Maslaha, see MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 267-82
(1991).
148. Umma means the Muslim community.
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Shari'ah.' 4 9
The circular relates to Section 31 of the 1917 Shari'ah Procedure Law and is a relatively long marsum. In essence, it deals
with the two categories of support recognized by Islamic law:
minimum support for former wives, and support for a woman
whose former husband is wealthy. With respect to both categories of maintenance, the Shari'ah Courts have appointed
mukhbirin, people whose roles are to assess the maintenance
sums. The marsum ruled that in divorce cases women were discriminated against, being the weaker parties in handling their
legal suits. In this context, the marsum makes note of the opinions of feminist organizations calling for the transfer of authority
in these matters from the Shari'ah Courts to the district court.
The marsum contains an apologetic discourse in which Islam is
presented as protecting the woman's right to "equality and dignity," but in doing so, it ignores the problems occasioned by a
clash between Islamic law and human rights. Having presented
the Islamic law and the statutes adopted by Arab States, the marsum directs "the qadis of the noble Shari'ah to utilize the
mukhbirin in the assessment of the sum of maintenance. The
qadis rule on the basis of evidence presented to them to determine the sum of maintenance in accordance with accepted con"1150
vention, thereby reaching the most just determination ....
The third legal circular was adopted on February 4, 1996,
and it addresses the issue of a last will and testament. Among
the reasons given for this circular, it states:
(W]e are responsible firstly to God and secondly to man, to
do our utmost to prevent harm. Furthermore, we are obliged
to ensure justice between men, to assist both the weak and
149. See generally Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Siyasah Shar'iyah, 6 Am.J. OF ISLAMIC
Soc. Sci. 59 (1989). Kamali states the following:
Siyasah shar'iyah is a broad doctrine of Islamic law which authorizes the ruler
to determine the manner in which the Shari'ah should be administered. The
ruler may accordingly take discretionary measures, enact rules and initiate policies as he deems are in the interest of good government, provided that no
substantive principle of the Shari'ah is violated thereby. The discretionary
powers of the ruler under siyasah shar'iyah are particularly extensive in the
field of criminal law. The head of [S]tate and those who are in charge of
public affairs, the 'ulu al amr, may thus decide on rules and procedures as they
deem appropriate in order to discover truth and to determine guilt.
Id.
150. See A. 135/98, which rather strangely refers to Section 31 of the Shari'ah Procedure Law.
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minors, and to deal with topics of which complaints are increasing. The source of any reform or amendment must reside exclusively in the Shari'ah. We should use the principles
and the foundations of the Shari'ah in order to generate an
original reform, which is grounded in Shari'ah adjudication,
and not on the ideals of litigants with no religious commitment. We have chosen to do this by way of legal circulars
which were also used in the past.
The marsum then proceeds to elaborate upon the source of
the authority and the reasons that necessitated the reform:
Given that the Muslims in this country do not benefit from
endowments established to allow their coming close to God
and in order to help persons in need. And for the needy persons who should have been the first ones to benefit from the
endowment and the services of the Islamic institutions, which
the social Islamic State established, to maintain societal harmony and human solidarity, there is no option but to appoint
persons responsible for the prevention of harm to those people and by virtue of our responsibility for their well-being. It
is the siyasah shar'iyah to open the doors of mercy to these
people, the same doors that are opened by the Shari'ah itself,
and to adopt the view that is easier and more convenient for
them. It allows us to establish the justice which is based upon
the Islamic source. Shari'ah adjudication is charged with the
maintenance ofjustice, and our adherents in this country are
entitled to benefit from Islamic justice and judicial justice.
We consider it the right of all Muslims to apply to the
Shari'ah Courts in order to avail themselves of the Shari'ah in
their daily lives. It is, therefore, unacceptable that a Muslim
should seek Islamic adjudication and not receive assistance
and not find justice. We therefore have decided to mandate
the principle of a Will and Testament for the deceased person's estate after his son and the other children, subject to
the following qualifications ....

This marsum purports to provide a solution for the following
legal issue: in Islamic inheritance law, when a father dies before
the grandfather, the grandchild will not inherit from the grandfather. The marsum examines the legislation in Egypt, Jordan
and Syria, 5 1 and then proposes a legal reform. The main reform gives the grandchild the right to inherit from his grandfa151. SeeJAMALJ. NASIR, THE ISLAMiC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 241-42 (2002).
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ther even if his father passed away prior to his grandfather. Such
152
cases are treated as if there had been a will and testament.
Assuming their legality,' 5 ' these marasim had dual roles. On
a level external to the Shari'ah Courts, they give the Courts legitimacy in the eyes of the public at large. The first marsum indicates that the qadis will no longer cooperate with the Israeli authorities in the expropriation of Muslims endowments. The second and the third marasim indicate that Islam protects human
rights generally, including women's rights.
The first marsum reveals the nationalistic aspect of the court
as the protector of land. The other two demonstrate the harmony between human rights and Islam, and in doing so convey a
message of conciliation to the groups active in promoting wo154
men's rights.
From the external Shari'ah perspective, these circulars can
be regarded as strengthening the status of the Shari'ah Appeals
152. In all events, the grandchild's portion shall not exceed one third.
153. As to the legality of circulars: they violate the principle of the separation of
powers, given that marasim are actually legislative acts; they amount to non-compliance
with Section 31 of the Shari'ah Procedure Law; and they also violate the principle of
legality. See generally Ramadan, supra note 2.
154. There are two main areas of discrimination against women in family matters
in classical Islamic law: the ability of a man to divorce his wife without her consent,
whereas the woman is unable to divorce her husband, except with his consent; and the
possibility of a Muslim man to still have up to four wives without such possibility being
offered to the women. Discrimination against the men includes the obligation of the
husband to pay alimony to his wife, and the non-existence of such obligation for the
wife. See SHAHEEN ALl SARDAR, GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL
LAw: EQUAL BEFORE ALLAH, UNEQUAL BEFORE MAN? (2001) (discussing the compatibility or incompatibility of Islamic law and human rights with regard to gender discrimination); see also ASGHAR ALl ENGINEER, THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN ISLAM (1992) (making a
distinction between contextual Qur'an verses and normative verses). Contextual verses
described women's situation during the period of revelation of the Qur'an and are
discriminatory against women. Normative verses are normative in the sense that they
prescribed the status of women in terms of how it should be, and recognized the equality between men and women. See Mohammad Fadel, Two Women, One Man: Knowledge,
Power, and Gender in Medieval Sunni Legal Thought, 29 INT'LJ. MIDDLE E. STUD. 185, 185204 (1997) (addressing the disparity in the treatment of testimony proffered by females
as opposed to that proffered by males under Islamic law, whereby the testimony of two
women is equivalent to the testimony of one man). Fadel explains that in addressing
this disparity, a distinction is made between political discourse, which concerns more
legalistic claims, and the normative discourse, which establishes a universal fact or
norm. Whereas in the first category, in the confines of the legal context, there is a
discrimination against women in testimonial matters, in the second category there is no
such discrimination and a woman can transmit the saying of the Prophet as a man
without discrimination.
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Court, as opposed to the civil courts. For example, the first circular demands that the decisions of the Shari'ah Courts be examined by the Shari'ah Appeals Court. The appointment of a
guardian for endowment assets must be reviewed by the Shari'ah
Appeals Court. The second circular explicitly confronts the danger to the Court's jurisdiction, caused by calls from feminist
groups to remove the jurisdiction from it to the civil court, by
ordering the use of mukhbirin in an attempt to increase the
amount of alimony allocated to former wives.
VIII. THE CRISIS OF THE SHARI'AH SYSTEM
Although the Shari'ah system began to gain some credibility
in the 1990s, in great part to the activity of the Shari'ah Appeals
Court, it entered a crisis caused apparendy by three affairs. The
first affair relates to a dispute that erupted between the Nazareth
Municipality and the Islamic waqf in Nazareth, over a palladium
that the Municipality claimed was designated as a public forum,
known as Shihab Aldin. The Islamic waqf claimed that the site
was designated for a mosque and an educational center. The
matter expanded into a national problem. To resolve the legal
question regarding the land classification, the Nazareth Municipality as well as other public figures requested the establishment
of a clarification committee headed by Qadi Natur. On April 15,
1998, the Deputy Minister of Religion disallowed Qadi Natur
from sitting on the committee, to allow the Court to decide the
matter. A letter following from the Minister of Religion stated
that the Deputy Minister had acted without authority. However,
it also stated that the Minister did not agree to Qadi Natur participating on the committee; thus Qadi Natur complied with its instruction and did not sit on the committee. The Minister of Religion's decision was then appealed in the High Court, and the
155
petition was rejected.
This affair harmed the position of the President of the
Shari'ah Appeals Court and placed him in the difficult position
of being pressured both to deliver the decision requested by the
Islamic movement, and to comply with the instructions from Is56
raeli government officials.1
155. H.C. 2777/98, Islamic Waqf Nazareth v. Minister of Religion TK. ELY. 99(2)
132 (unpublished decision) (on file with author).
156. For further discussion, see LAjNAT AL-DIFA ET AL., HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND
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The second matter that pushed the Shari'ah system towards
crisis relates to the adoption of children, which is proscribed by
Islam. This prohibition is based upon the Qur'an and the fifth
verse of the message of covenant-partners: "call the adopted
children by the name of their father, for it is more correct in
Allah's eyes."'157 This verse intends to discontinue the use of a
custom from the period of jahiliya15 ' by which an adopted son
regarded his adoptive father as his biological father. The
Prophet Muhammed himself adopted Zayd, and people referred
to him as Zayd, son of Muhammed; however, after the revelation
of this verse they begin calling him Zayd, son of Haritha. 1 59 In
an oral opinion, Qadi Natur examined the issue of adoption, and
in doing so adopted a more conservative view - an absolute prohibition of adoption. He was opposed by Sheikh Raed Salah,
who believed in taking into account the interests of the Muslim
public when considering adoption, thereby making the prohibition more flexible. Their relations deteriorated, causing an
open split between the Islamic movement in Raed Salah's sec16
tion, and the Appeals Court.
The third matter driving the Shari'ah system to crisis concerns the storm caused when feminist organizations petitioned
the Israeli High Court to reject a qadi recommendation of the
Qadis Appointments Committee, because in their opinion, he
lacked the necessary legal or Shari'ah education.' 6 ' In the organizations' petition, they questioned the reasoning of the President of the Shari'ah Court of Appeals, A. Natur, who had previously opposed appointing a candidate because he did not have
SHARI'A[H] ASPECTS (1998);Joseph Algazy, Les Islamistes, une Force qui Compte en Israel, LE

March 2, 2000, at 23; Daphne Tsimhoni, The Christiansin Israel:
AspecLt of Integrationand the Search for Identity of a Minority Within a Minority, in MIDDLE
EASTERN MINORITIES AND DIASPORAS 124-52 (Moshe Ma'oz & Gabriel Sheffer eds., 2002).
157. Al-Ahzab 33.5.
158. Jahiliya is the period preceding the emergence of Islam.
159. 2 IBN KATHIR, TAFSIR AL QUR'AN AL'AZIM § 5, at 423-24 (1970); 3 AL-QuuRTUBI, ALJAMI' LI-AHKAM ALQU'AN At.-'AZIM 119-21 (1967). On the problem of adoption
in Islamic law, see generally MOHAMMAD H. FADEL, FOUNDLINGS AND ADOPTION: ToWARD AN ISLAMIC LAW OF ADOPTION (n.d.) (on file with author).
160. This opinion is based on the author's interviews with Islamist leaders in May
and June 2000 in the city of Um AI-Fahim. For the position of another Islalnist leader
on the issue of adoption in Islamic law, see Panel on Adoption Organized by Sanadforthe
Welfare of the Child and Motherhood, SAWr AL-HAQ IWAL-HURRIYA, June 16, 2000, at 2-3.
161. H.C. 1008/01, Miriam Suleiman Amar, et al. v. Minister for Religious Affairs,
et al. T.K. D.S. 11455(1) (2001) (unpublished decision) (on file with author).
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE,
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an academic degree. 16 2 In this case Qadi Natur supported a can163
didate without a legal or Shari'ah degree.
These three cases clearly damaged the Shari'ah system. The
Appeals Court had striven to achieve certain balances: the presentation of the nationalist discourse as opposed to the conservative position which was adopted in Islamic Waqf Nazareth, accentuated the fact that a qadi in Israel is subordinate to Israeli authorities and has to obey them. The case involving the adoption
of children influenced a wide sector of the Muslim population
and its Islamization. Finally, the attempt to synthesize Islam and
women's rights was also undermined when the Qadi Appointments Committee was criticized by women's organization for its
alleged support of a candidate without Shari'ah or legal education.
These factors are not the only reason for the crisis of the
Shari'ah system in Israel. But, they are indicative of the permanent tension between the feminist movement and the Islamic
movement. The Shari'ah system in Israel does not give full
rights to women despite the Equality of Rights Law. 6 4 Despite
the fact that this law was intended to establish equality between
men and women in all legal acts, 6 5 it does not cover marriage
and divorce, 66 areas in which the main inequalities exist in Islamic law as applied in Israel. There is an additional law, which
criminalizes unilateral divorce by the husband and criminalizes
polygamy, but it does not go far enough in protecting women
because it only applies criminal sanctions to the offending husband without creating civil remedies for the wife. 1 67 The reservations of the State of Israel to the Convention for the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ("CEDAW")' 6 8
162. H.C. 7193/97, Mustafa 'Abed v. The Minister of Religious Affairs, 52(5) P.D.
365.
163. Petitioner's brief at 6, H.C. 1008/01, Miriam Suleiman Amar, et al. v. Minister
for Religious Affairs, et al., T.X. D.S. 11455(1) (2001) (unpublished decision) (on file
with author).
164. The Equality Rights Law, 1951, S.H. 82.
165. Id. art. 1.
166. Id. art. 5.
167. See LAViSH, supra note 20, at 73-74, 132-34.
168. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 21, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180
(Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]. "Israel registers its reservation regarding section
16 of the Convention, to the extent that the laws of personal status which bind the
religious communities in Israel do not cohere with the provisions of that Section." K.A.
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and to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR") "' are symbolic of these inequalities. 7 '
From the Islamic perspective, the current Shari'ah system
suffers from at least three main legitimacy problems: the education of the qadis; the appointment of the qadis; and, the absence
of an organ that functions as a legislature for the Muslim community. The first generation of qadis was educated in AlAzhar. "7' 1 By the 1960s, after the death of the last qadis educated
there, the Shari'ah system entered a period of crisis and the
problem gave rise to a widespread debate that produced no solution. 7 The Qadi Law of 1961 did not mandate formal Shari'ah
education.' 7 3 The recent Qadi Law of 2002 raised the required
level of education, yet it too failed to mandate formal Shari'ah
education.17 4 At the present time, no qadi has completed a degree in a Shari'ah school, and the recent Qadi Law states that the
failure to impose this requirement is based on the absence of
any system of permanent and formal Shari'ah education in
Israel. This is inaccurate. There are at least two schools in Israel
that teach Shari'ah: one is in Baqa and is recognized by the
State, 7 5 and the other is in Um al-Fahim, although it has not
received State recognition. 7 6 Another option available to Israel
for improving the legitimacy of the Shari'ah system is to send
Muslims to study Shari'ah in Turkey, Morocco, or Jordan. This
absence of Shari'ah education of the qadis aggravates the process
1033, 197, 181, 31. CEDAW was adopted on December 18, 1979, and became effective
in Israel on November 2, 1991.
169. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (xxi),
999 U.N.T.S. at 171 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
Having consideration for Section 34 [sic Sec. 24] of the Convention and any
of its other provisions regarding which this current qualification may be relevant, personal status matters in Israel are subordinate to the religious law of
the affected parties and in the event of such a law not being consistent with its
undertakings under the Convention, Israel reserves the right to apply the law.
ICA. 1040, 295, 270, 31.
170. These inequalities are not unique to Islamic law. See Courtney W. Howland,
The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An
Analysis Under the United Nations Charter, 35 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271 (1997).
171. See generally ZEGHAL, supra note 22.
172. PELED, supra note 24, at 120-27.
173. The Qadis Law, 1961, S.H. 339.
174. The Qadis Law (No. 10) 2002.
175. LOUER, supra note 26, at 204-07.
176. See generally Peled, supra note 74.
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of secularization of Islamic law and the Muslim public's mistrust
of the system.
Additionally, in Israel, when deciding cases the qadi cannot
refer to ulama, a community of Muslim scholars who are specialists in Islamic law, and their written scholarship: there is no
corpus of ulama in Israel. If such a body did exist, it 1could
pro77
vide the necessary guidance and knowledge to qadis.
The second legitimacy problem that the Shari'ah system
struggles with is the appointment system for qadis, in which nonMuslims are allowed to play a role. Under the Qadi Law, the
appointment committee must be composed of nine members, of
which only five must be Muslim. The other four may come from
any religious denomination and there have been non-Muslim
members of the government and the Parliament. Once the appointment committee nominates qadis, the President of Israel
formally appoints them. Even though Hanafi Islamic law allows
qadis to be appointed by infidels, 178 it nonetheless raises legitimacy problems. Bechor Shalom Shitrit, Minister for Minorities
in 1949, had a keen appreciation of this problem, and to resolve
it he proposed that Muslims in Israel appoint the chief qadi and
1 79
that he, in turn, appoint the other qadis:
Given that the Islamic community in Israel requires a legal
authority for matters related to personal status, some kind of
resolution must be made. In my opinion, the easiest way is to
declare the election of a Supreme Shari'ah Judge by members of the Islamic community, who will have the authority to
appoint both judges and Muftis in Israel, with the approval of
the Prime Minister of the State of Israel. This will enable us
to satisfy all the opinions and we will not have to rely upon
the scholars
of Islamic law, whose views on the issue are prob80
lematic.'
The third problem that the Shari'ah system suffers from is
the absence of a Muslim legislature. All of the other religious
177. For a recent study of the role of ulama in contemporary Islam, see generally
QASIM, THE ULAALA in CONTEMPORARY ISLAM: CUSTODIANS OF
CHANGE (2002).
178. Id. at 27. ("A Muslim judge, even if appointed by an infidel king, is acceptable as a Shari'ah judge.") (quoting Ashraf 'All Thanawi in 2 IMAD AL-FATWA 509 (Mufti
Muhammad Shaft ed., Idarat ta'lifat I awliya 1294 A.H.)).
MUHAMMAD MUHAMMAD

179.

BECHOR

(1949).
180. See id.
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minorities in Israel apply their own personal status law that is
adopted by their own responsible legislative body. The Muslim
community does not have such a body and therefore does not
choose its own religious law. The qadis apply a law that, for the
most part, dates back to 1917. The procedural and substantive
law was codified primarily during the Ottoman Empire. The antiquity of the law has created significant problems in adapting
Islamic law to contemporary demands and circumstances. The
Shari'ah Courts inevitably adapt the law, but they suffer from a
lack of legitimacy because of the absence of formal Shari'ah education and the method of their appointment. Furthermore, the
Israeli State does not take on the function of legislature because,
according to its official policy, it does not interfere with substantive areas of Islamic law. The fact that Israel does not allow a
Muslim legislature, however, does interfere with a substantive
area of Islamic law.
IX. AN OUTLINE FOR A REFORM PROPOSAL
The Shari'ah Appeals Court has recently broadened its base
of support. From 1954 until the middle of 1999, the Shari'ah
Appeals Court gave 288 decisions dealing with child custody.
More than half were given over the previous six years. About
394 claims relating to disputes under Section 130 of the Ottoman Family Law'' were filed from 1954 through 1999; of these,
253 claims were filed between 1994 and 1999. Between 1954 and
1966, there was only one ruling relating to child custody. Yet
despite the increased judicial activity of the Shari'ah Appeals
Court, it is currently in a state of crisis. The enactment of the
Family Courts Law (Amendment No. 5) 2001 can be interpreted
as symbolizing the failure of reform attempts within the Shari'ah
system, since this amendment reduces the jurisdiction of the
Shari'ah Courts in Israel. Once enacted, some matters that were
formerly under exclusive jurisdiction of the Shari'ah Courts
(e.g., custody, alimony, and maintenance) also fell under the
parallel jurisdiction of the civil judiciary system. Feminist organizations were steadfast in their support of the enactment of this
181. Section 130 of the Ottoman Family Law recognizes the right to dissolve a
marriage on the initiative of both spouses when there is "niza' washiqaq" [discord and
incompatibility]. On Section 130, see LA-visii, supra note 20, at 168-71, 206-09; YA'AKOV
MERON, MOSLEM LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 147, 150-51, 213 (2001).
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law in the Israeli Parliament, despite the Court's reform attempts. Sheikh Raid Salah, the head of the northern branch of
the Islamic movement, regarded the law's enactment as a plot
against Muslims, and he called for the establishment of private
Shari'ah Courts. 18 2 The result is that the Shari'ah Court finds
itself under attack from both sides, and one can conclude that
the Court's structural crisis results mainly from both an absence
of respect for women's rights and the absence of religious legitimacy.
In this section, I will briefly suggest two possible reforms
that address these problems. Given the space constraints, however, my suggestions cannot be adequately developed at this time
and their full exploration will have to wait for a future article. In
this context, I will limit my comments to their main tenets,
though many questions will need further development. Autonomy for the Muslim minority in Israel is the key to addressing
both the Islamic critics and the feminist critics.
Currently, the Shari'ah system does not benefit from autonomy as do the Christian and Druze communities. 8 ' Autonomy
182. SAwr AL-HAQ WAL-HURRYA, Nov. 9, 2001, at 12-13.
183. There are two primary models of religious autonomy in Israel for recognized
religious minorities. The first model is the full autonomy model, in which the community in question maintains its own representative body. This representative body
chooses its leaders according to their respective religious laws without any legal interference from the State and without the need for any act of confirmation by the State. In
this model, the representative of the religious community is empowered to render its
own rules in matters over which it permissibly exercises jurisdiction. This autonomy is
protected by international agreement and cannot be modified unilaterally. All of the
decisions rendered through the representative body, regardless of its position outside
of Israel, are recognized. An example of this first model is the Catholic Church. Indeed, the Catholic community in Israel benefits from the highest degree of autonomy.
The church itself defines its own organization and its own law. The Pope establishes
canon law. The Church itself establishes its own organization without any legal intervention of the Israeli State. Concerning the organization of the Catholic community in
Israel, one should differentiate between Latin Catholics, who submit directly to the authority of the Pope, and the Oriental Catholic communities who have their own autonomy within the Catholic Church. This religious autonomy is anchored in bilateral
agreements between the Holy See and the State of Israel on the one hand, and in
agreements between the Ottoman Empire and France on the other. See Moussa Abou
Ramadan, La Protection de la Libertg Religieuse des Minorites en Israel, 5 MEDITERRANEAN J.
OF HUM. RTs. 251, 282-93 (2001); Les accords de Mytilne de 1901 et l'Agrment de Constantinople de 1913, in DE BONAPARTE A BALFOUR 57-69 (D. Trimbur & R. Aaronsohn eds.,
2001). The second model is the restricted, or regulated, autonomy model. Under this
model, the religious community has a representative body but the regulation of this
representative body is not within the autonomy of the religious community. Rather, the
autonomy is regulated unilaterally by the State and the community has no right to
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may be defined as the recognition of jurisdiction over certain
matters. Autonomy may be personal in that jurisdiction is exercised over persons based on their ethnic, linguistic, or religious
affiliations. Autonomy can also be territorial if jurisdiction is exercised over all persons present in a certain territorial region of
the State. In order for autonomy to emerge, the State must recognize the minority community and its representative organ. 84
In the Israeli Shari'ah system, the Muslim community is
neither recognized by the State nor is there any Muslim representative body with the power to decide religious issues. The
committee that appoints qadis is not permanent and it only
nominates them; it is the Israeli President who officially invests
qadis with their function. Although five of the committee's nine
members are Muslim, this does not make it autonomous. The
Shari'ah system itself is controlled by the Ministry of Justice,
from which it receives its budget. This does not mean that the
Shari'ah Courts cannot broaden their powers within the existing
system or that Israel is a totalitarian State that controls every
movement of all Muslim institutions. This is the case with the
most prestigious Islamic institution, the Sunni Alazhar, which developed a certain amount of independence vis-d-vis the State
during certain periods, even though it was incorporated in the
bureaucracy of the Egyptian State."8 5 But this is only defacto autonomy. Unlike the courts of the recognized religious Christian
communities, the Shari'ah Courts in Israel are incorporated into
the State court system, as are the Rabbinical Court and Druze
change its own organization. In contrast to the full autonomy model, the autonomy of
this second model is not protected by international treaty and is subject to modification
by the State, either by law or regulation. One example of this model is that of the
Rome-Orthodox community. See Moussa Abou Ramadan, La Loi Applicable a la Minorite
Roum Orthodoxe de l'Etat d'Israel, 50 PROCHE-ORIENT CHRETIEN 105-41 (2000). In addition, the Druze community was reorganized in 1995 and 1996 to fit this model. See
GABRIEL BEN DOR, THE DRUZES IN ISRAEL: A POLITICAL STUDY POLITICAL INNOVATION
AND INTEGRATION IN A MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITY (1979); KAIs M. FIRO, THE DRUZES IN
THE JEwISH STATE: A BRIEF HISTORY (1999).
184. For these elements, see Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the Legal Understanding of
Autonomy, in AUTONOM. APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 7-32 (Markku Suksi ed.,
1998). For the autonomy and international law, see generally RUTH LAPIDOTH, AUTONOMY- FLEXIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS (1997).
185. MALIKA ZEGHAL, GARDIENS DE L'ISLAM: LES OULEMAS D'AL AZHAR DANS
L'EGYPTE CONTEMPORAINE (1996); Tamir Noustafa, Conflict and Cooperation Between the
State and Religious Institutions in ContemporaryEgypt, 32 INT'LJ. MIDDLE E. STUD. 3, 3-22
(2000).
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18 6

Strengthening the position of the Shari'ah Appeals
Court and the present Shari'ah system does not lead to Islamic
autonomy, given that the Shari'ah Courts are State courts, and as
such are distinct from the ecclesiastic courts which, as stated, enjoy full autonomy. The Shari'ah Courts have undergone a process of bureaucratization, 8 7 but making them stronger has not
enhanced Islamic communal autonomy. What has happened in
fact has been a redistribution of power among government authorities, in this case, between the legislative authority and the
judicial authority. The existence of the Shari'ah system in Israel
at best could be called what one author refers to as polyethnic
88
rights. 1
I propose the establishment of an organ to take charge of
the appointment of the qadis, thus eliminating the problem of
the nomination by non-Muslim authorities. This organ would
have the power to adopt new Islamic law, which would be
adapted to the current needs of Muslims in Israel. This organ
would also develop and promote education in Islamic law. This
solution would provide the Shari'ah system with the Islamic legitimacy it currently lacks. All of the officially recognized religious
minorities in Israel enjoy autonomy. In granting autonomy to
Muslims too, Israel will discharge its obligation to guarantee
equality for all religious minorities.
Autonomy, like many other collective rights, could create a
problem for minorities within the minority. This problem could
be resolved by creating an opt-out provision for those who believe that their rights have been damaged. The second mechanism for limiting oppression of internal minorities is the election
of members to the representative organ. Elections, particularly
in a system of proportional representation, would encourage
representatives of the community to undertake the necessary reforms or face the prospect of being ousted from office. Elections would also avoid the longstanding tension such as that
courts.

186. For a different point of view, see LawsH, supra note 20, at 2; Ilan Saban,
Framework for Comparative Analysis and the Arab-Palestinian Minority in Israel (on file
with author); Ido Schahar, Palestinians in an Israeli Court: Culture, Control, and Resistance in the Israeli Shari'a[h] Court of WestJerusalem (2000) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Hebrew University) (on file with author).
187. David Neuhass, Between Quiescence and Arousal: The Political Functions of
Religion: A Case Study of the Arab Minority in Israel, 1948-1990, at 33-38 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University) (on file with author).
188. WILL KyMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 30-31, 37-38 (1995).
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which exists in the Christian Orthodox community between
members of the community and the Patriarchate, who is chosen
by the Greek Orthodox Church and not the community.
The solution briefly described above will require courage
from decision-makers. When the State of Israel was established,
a Ministry of Minorities was created and was filled by Bechor
Shalom Shitrit who tried to give some form of organization to
the Muslim minority. However, the Ministry was abolished
shortly thereafter and no similar attempt has been made to date.
In the period stretching from the 1950s through the 1980s," 9
the fear was that Islam would foster nationalism. Later, in the
1980s, the Israeli authorities became afraid that the Shari'ah system would be taken over by the internal Israeli Islamist movement, forgetting that one of the reasons for the rise of the Islamist movement was the absence of a credible Shari'ah system
and autonomy for Muslims. Now, after September 11 2001, political resistance to autonomy for Muslims has worsened because
of the perceived "Islamic threat." '
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have shown that the Shari'ah Appeals Court
attempted to occupy the vacuum existing in religious Islamic
law. The Court asserted its authority in a number of ways: by
reaffirming its power over the regional Shari'ah Courts; by imposing its authority over the litigants before it; and by enhancing
its symbolic image. The Shari'ah Court even created its own hierarchy of law by relying heavily on Islamic law and less so on
Israeli State law. The Court also attempted to pass its own version of legislation by issuing new circulars, which were designed
to gain the confidence of feminist and Islamic movements.
However, in some cases, it was unsuccessful in expanding its
powers with relation to the civil courts. Notwithstanding this aggrandizement of power, the system is in crisis. I have argued
that the crisis is structural because the Shari'ah system is, and
189. Peled, supra note 24, at 7.
190. On July 17, 2002, the Supreme Court of Israel dismissed a petition on behalf
of Sheikh Raed Salah, one of the leaders of the Islamic movement in Israel, requesting
the court to declare the illegality of an order issued on February 16, 2002, prohibiting
Salah from traveling outside the country. See H.C. 4706/02, Raed Salah, et al. v. The
Minister of the Interior, 56(5) P.D. 695. On May 13, 2003, the head of the Islamic
Movement and other Islamic Movement leaders were arrested and detained.

298

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

continues to be, attacked both by the Islamic movement as lacking Islamic legitimacy and by the feminist movement as discriminating against women. To resolve this structural crisis I propose
granting religious autonomy to Muslims, thereby enhancing Islamic legitimacy, while at the same time giving the right of exit
to minorities who feel oppressed. For this solution to be
adopted, the Israeli political community must embrace a less
fearful attitude towards the "Islamic threat" and the Orthodox
Jewish community must change its attitude toward the relationship between State and religion. Until this happens the Shari'ah
system will face permanent structural crisis, despite its short period of strength.

